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Executive Summary 
A common view is that the performance of the UK economy between 1997 and 2010 under 
Labour was very weak and that the current economic problems are a consequence of poor 
policies in this period. In this report, we analyse the historical performance of the UK 
economy since 1997 compared with other major advanced economies and with performance 
prior to 1997, notably the years of Conservative government, 1979-97.  
We focus on measures of business performance, especially productivity growth. This is a key 
economic indicator as in the long run, productivity determines material wellbeing – wages 
and consumption. Productivity determines the size of the “economic pie” available to the 
citizens of a country. 
The big picture 
We conclude that relative to other major industrialised countries, the UK’s performance was 
good after 1997. The growth of GDP per capita – 1.42% a year between 1997 and 2010 – was 
better than in any of other “G6” countries: Germany (1.26%), the US (1.22%), France 
(1.04%), Japan (0.52%) and Italy (0.22%). Figure 1 shows GDP per capita levels in four 
countries relative to 1997. The height of the line indicates the cumulative growth: in 2010, 
the UK had a level of GDP per capita 17% higher than in 1997; over the same period US 
GDP per capita had grown by 14%. 
The UK’s high GDP per capita growth was driven by strong growth in productivity (GDP per 
hour), which was second only to the US, and good performance in the jobs market (which 
was better than in the US). The UK’s relative economic performance appears even stronger in 
the years prior to 2008 before the Great Recession engulfed the developed world.  
But wasn’t it all a bubble? 
The UK’s strong productivity performance relative to other countries was a continuation of 
the trends during the period of Conservative government from 1979. This broke a pattern of 
relative economic decline stretching back a century or more. UK GDP per person fell relative 
to the US, Germany and France from 1870 to 1979, but over the next three decades this trend 
reversed. UK GDP per capita was about 23% above the US in 1870 whereas the US was 43% 
ahead of the UK in 1979. By 2007, the UK still lagged behind the US, but the gap had closed 
to 33%. During the past 30 years, the UK has had a faster catch-up of GDP per capita with 
the US under Labour than under the Conservatives, although there was a slower rate of 
relative improvement over France.  
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Trends in GDP per capita (adult) 1979-2010 (relative to 1997) 
 
Notes: Analysis based on OECD data. GDP is US$, constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base year (2005). 
Adults refer to the population over 16, for which data is sourced from US Bureau of Labour Force Statistics 
(“working age adults” series). Data for Unified Germany from 1991. For each country the logged series is set to 
zero in 1997, so the level of the line in any year indicates the cumulative growth rate (e.g. a value of 0.1 in 2001 
indicates that the series has grown by exp(0.1)-1=11% between 1997 and 2001). The steeper the slope of the 
line, the faster growth has been over that period. 
But was the growth in productivity due to “unsustainable bubbles” in sectors such as finance, 
property, oil and the public sector? The answer is “no”. The expansion of property and the 
public sector both actually held back measured aggregate productivity. The financial sector 
contributed only about 0.4% of the 2.8% annual growth in the UK market economy between 
1997 and 2007. Our analysis shows that the biggest contributors to productivity increases 
were the business services and distribution sectors, and they were generated through the 
increased importance of skills and new technologies. It is difficult to see why all such 
activities could be generated by an artificial financial or property bubble. 
Analysis of other indicators of business performance, such as foreign direct investment, 
innovation, entrepreneurship and skills, supports our view that the gains in productivity were 
largely real rather than a statistical artefact. This evidence points to a more positive reading of 
the supply side of the economy than the current consensus. Although the UK still has some 
long-standing issues in terms of lower investment relative to other G6 economies (especially 
in R&D and vocational skills), things have improved. 
Did Labour’s policies have any positive influence? 
Some have argued that Labour simply enjoyed a “free ride” on the radicalism of Mrs 
Thatcher. Most analysis suggests that freeing up the labour market through breaking union 
militancy, removing subsidies for “lame ducks” and implementing privatisation, lower 
marginal tax rates and cuts in benefits all boosted productivity performance after 1979. On 
this line of argument the best that could be said is that at least Labour did not return to the 
failed pro-union, anti-competitive policies of the 1970s.  
The “at least Labour didn’t mess it up” argument is not at all compelling. It is hard to believe 
that the reforms in the conservative years permanently kept productivity growth higher for 
the next 15 years. The anti-union policies may have raised output, for example, but it 
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stretches credulity to think they kept the UK on a permanently better productivity growth 
path. 
We argue that it is more likely that some policies of the Labour government drove some of 
the productivity improvement. In particular, the strengthening of competition policy, the 
support for innovation, the expansion of university education and better regulation in 
telecoms and elsewhere played a positive role. It is possible that immigration may have also 
played a positive role. But establishing the magnitude of the causal impact of these policies is 
extremely difficult, and the need for proper quantitative policy evaluation remains as strong 
as ever.  
The policy area where Labour cleared failed was in financial regulation. In addition, and 
more clearly with hindsight, public debt was allowed to rise higher than it should have. 
Although these factors did not drive the boom and did not cause the global recession by 
themselves, the UK economy was more vulnerable to the recession than it should have been. 
Does the Great Recession change everything? 
Does the experience of the recession since 2008 show that the productivity improvements to 
the supply side since 1997 were illusory? We have argued “no” as the 1997-2010 
improvements were real and not due to the bubble sectors of finance, property and oil.  
But how much did the financial crisis permanently reduce the rate and level of productivity 
growth? The extreme version of the “supply-side pessimism” argument is that because the 
recession was caused by a banking crisis, the fall in potential output has been severe, the 
UK’s output gap (the difference between actual and potential GDP) is now close to zero with 
productivity growth permanently lower for the foreseeable future. Pessimists point to the 7% 
fall in GDP and slower growth from the trough of the 2009 recession. 
It is likely that the recession has caused some permanent fall in output compared with what it 
would have been without such a deep downturn. But we think there is huge uncertainty over 
the size of the output gap. An alternative explanation to a supply shock that had permanently 
reduced the level and growth rate of potential output is that global demand is muted. Several 
elements point in this more optimistic direction. First, the pre-2008 productivity growth rate 
suggests that the supply side made real improvements before the crisis. Second, the fall in 
productivity 2008-11 is broad based and not all due to specific sectors such as finance and oil 
(just as the 1997-2008 productivity growth rates were not dominated by these sectors). Third, 
we look at the evidence put forward by the pessimists on inflation, jobs, capacity utilisation 
surveys and trade performance, and argue that none of these make a compelling case that the 
output gap is tiny. 
We worry that policies based on an excessively pessimistic view of potential output can lead 
to needlessly slow economic growth. Indeed, the pessimism over the state of the supply side 
can become self-fulfilling as ever-larger austerity programmes cause excess scrapping of 
human and physical capital. 
Policies in the short to medium run: to Plan B or not to Plan B? 
The current “Plan A” for the UK economy is a period of very strong fiscal consolidation – 
spending cuts and tax rises to eliminate the structural public sector deficit in the life of this 
Parliament. An alternative Plan B would be to slow down the pace of the fiscal consolidation. 
If the output gap was near zero, then a Plan B would simply increase inflation, so the fact that 
we think there is a good chance of a substantial output gap implies the possibility of a Plan B.  
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The desirability of a Plan B would be muted if monetary policy was sufficient, if fiscal policy 
was ineffective in an open economy like the UK, if any increase in public spending or tax 
cuts was irreversible or if markets would panic at any retreat from Plan A.  
We consider these problems, but do not find them overwhelming objections. We argue that 
we do indeed need a medium-term plan for debt reduction but this does not have to be done at 
the current speed when the world economy is so fragile. This is also true for Northern 
Eurozone countries and the US. Thus we need a short-term stimulus (“Plan B”) and a long-
term growth strategy (“Plan V”). 
A strategy for long-run growth 
Whatever view is taken on shorter-term policies, all sides agree on the need to focus on 
longer-term growth. We draw out some of the lessons from our analysis for how to restore 
longer-term growth.  
The structural improvement in the UK’s relative performance since 1979 contained the lesson 
that getting the market environment right is key: strong product market competition, 
openness to foreign investment, flexible labour markets, a robust welfare to work system and 
smart regulation are major factors in promoting growth. Government has a role in all of this, 
setting the rules, and it also needs to be pro-active in building human capital and 
infrastructure and supporting innovation.  
We argue that a growth strategy must go beyond the “laundry list” approach (even if such a 
list is useful) as policies interact with each other and policy efforts must be tightly focused. 
We sketch a plan for a “V-shaped” recovery that requires the state and civil society to scan 
the global economy for potential growth in demand, and then hone in on areas where the UK 
has actual or latent comparative advantage. Within this space there has to be relentless 
scrutiny of where the state is hindering and where it could help. A specific example is higher 
education where foreign students are an export industry of global growth and where the UK 
has very successful elite science. Restricting high skilled immigration is hugely damaging to 
this sector. More generally, growth policies could include supporting sector-specific skills, 
access to credit for small enterprises and subsidising innovation in key industries like green 
technologies, software and healthcare. We offer less of a blueprint for growth than a way of 
thinking about growth that could form the basis for economic revival. 
Some caveats 
This is a data-driven report and data change by the day. Our conclusions may change as we 
get more information, and this is especially true of the period since 2008. This report focuses 
on business performance, above all productivity as this is a key economic measure of welfare. 
This is not because we think other dimensions of the economy are unimportant, but rather 
because we have limited space.  
We discuss labour markets to some degree, especially with regard to how job performance 
affects overall GDP per capita growth and the issue of long-term unemployment, but it is less 
of a focus than business performance. We discuss inequality only in regard to regional 
variations as some have argued that these spatial differences have a causal effect on overall 
growth.  
Finally, we are well aware that measured national output does not reflect all aspects of the 
human condition, such as happiness, health and the environment. But we remain strongly of 
the view that the growth of national output per person is all else equal, a desirable thing. 
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A roadmap to the report 
We present the “big picture” in Section 1 on macro trends on GDP and productivity and then 
decompose where this growth is coming from – which industries and which factors. Section 2 
then looks at a host of other indicators of business performance, such as investment, 
innovation and entrepreneurship. We show improvements since 1997 and ask in Section 3 
whether any of these were caused by Labour’s policies. Section 4 examines the Great 
Recession after 2008 focusing on the UK as detailed comparative data are not available for 
all countries yet. Section 5 turns to policies: we look first at the short and medium run, 
focusing on austerity, and then on long-run growth strategies. 
1. UK Relative Economic Performance Since 1997: Growth, Productivity 
and Jobs 
1.1 Introduction 
We begin by laying out some of the facts of economic performance since 1997, but put this in 
an international and historical context. First we look at the aggregate trends in GDP, 
productivity and jobs (sub-section 1.2). After showing the surprisingly strong UK 
performance we look in more detail at where productivity has come from in terms of the 
contribution of different sectors, such as finance, and different factor inputs such as capital 
and skills (sub-section 1.3).  
Overall, we find that British performance was impressive between 1997-2010 compared to 
other major countries both in terms of productivity and the labour market. The productivity 
performance was not primarily driven by the “bubble” sectors of finance, property or 
government services. Rather, human capital, ICT and efficiency improvements were the 
dominant forces especially in the business services and distribution sectors.  
1.2 Analysis of Aggregate Trends in National Income and Productivity 
We begin by comparing the macro-level economic performance of the UK with its major 
peers. There is an argument for focusing our analysis of the Labour period up to 2008 – i.e. 
before the Great Recession which was essentially a global shock.  However a tougher test is 
to look across the whole period in which Labour was in government through 2010. Since we 
know that the UK was hit harder than most other nations by the Great Recession we would 
expect the record to be poorer when including the later years. In Table 1 the first three 
columns examine the 1997-2010 period and the last three columns the 1997-2007 period. 
We use data from the OECD, which contains internationally comparable data on output, 
employment, hours and the other elements to estimate economic performance. Table 1 shows 
that during the 1997-2010 period UK GDP growth was second only to the US (1.93% p.a. vs. 
2.22% p.a). Of course, absolute economic growth is not as important for welfare as national 
income per person as this will ultimately determine wages and consumption. In terms of GDP 
per capita (in terms of total population), a key measure of economic welfare, the UK 
outperformed every other country in Table 1 (1.42% a year compared to 1.22% in the US and 
as low as 0.22% in Italy).  
Could some of these patterns be driven simply by worse demographic trends? To partially 
control for this, the third column of Table 1 presents GDP per adult, (and this is the main 
measure of overall economic performance that we use in this paper). Here again, the UK 
outperformed all the other advanced nations including the US and Germany. Although data 
from the most recent years is likely to be revised, even if the UK’s 2008-2010 growth was 
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much worse than recorded, it’s relative position over the entire post 1997 period is unlikely to 
dramatically change  (other countries will also have their data revised). 
Table 1: Growth of GDP, GDP per person and GDP per adult, 1997-2010 
Notes: Cumulative annual growth rates (in %). Analysis based on OECD data (extracted on 28 Oct 2011 from 
OECD.Stat). GDP is US$, constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base year (2005) from GDP database. Adults 
refer to “working age adults”, obtained from US Bureau of Labour Force Statistics, and includes the civilian 
non-institutional population aged over 16. Data for Unified Germany from 1991. 
Following the approach of Card and Freeman (2004) we focus on GDP per adult as our 
preferred measure of GDP per capita (in columns (3) and (6) of Table 1) for further analysis. 
The denominator is defined as adults in the civilian, non-institutional population over the age 
of 16 (for most countries)
1
. Output per capita can be decomposed into its constituent elements: 
output per labour input (or “productivity”) and labour input per capita (a measure of labour 
market performance). Two alternative measures of labour input are considered: number of 
workers and total hours worked
2
. This type of decomposition allows us to determine how 
much of a country’s growth performance is due to working “smarter” (i.e. productivity gains) 
versus working “harder” (higher employment rates or hours per average adult).  
In order to try to appraise Labour’s impact on the economy, we also compare the UK’s 
performance over 1997-2010 not only to its most relevant peers, but also its performance 
over the preceding years. For this purpose, it makes most sense to consider the period 1979-
1997 which corresponds to the Thatcher-Major led Conservative governments. 
The results are contained in Figure 1 (GDP per capita), Figure 2 (GDP per worker) and 
Figure 3 (GDP per hour). We base each series in 1997 to show the cumulative performance 
of the UK and other countries before and after the 1997 election, so the slope of the line can 
be interpreted as growth rates. We plot GDP per capita in Figure 1. The fact that the UK line 
                                                 
1
 Data on “working age adults” is obtained from USBLS http://www.bls.gov/fls/flscomparelf/population.htm. 
Card and Freeman (2004) used USBLS for civilian, non-institutional working age adults for 15-64 year olds, but 
the current USBLS data that we use is defined as the civilian non-institutional population over the age at which 
compulsory schooling ends (16 for most countries), and has no upper limit. It is noted that the German data 
includes the institutional population. OECD data on 15-64 year olds is currently unavailable for 2010 for all four 
countries considered here, but we obtain qualitatively similar results to those reported here when using this data 
over the shorter time period. 
2
 As defined at http://www.oecd.org/document/29/0,3746,en_2649_29964795_48571357_1_1_1_1,00.html, 
labour input is defined as total hours worked by all persons engaged. The data are derived as average hours 
worked (from the OECD Employment Outlook, OECD Annual National Accounts, OECD Labour Force 
Statistics and national sources) multiplied by the corresponding and consistent measure of employment for each 
particular country.  
GDP GDP per 
capita 
(person)
GDP per 
capita 
(adult)
GDP GDP per 
capita 
(person)
GDP per 
capita 
(adult)
UK 1.93 1.42          1.22          2.89 2.43          2.20          
US 2.22 1.22          0.99          3.00 1.96          1.64          
Germany 1.24 1.26          1.01          1.67 1.64          1.35          
France 1.66 1.04          0.92          2.31 1.66          1.51          
Japan 0.59 0.52          0.31          1.15 1.02          0.79          
Italy 0.69 0.22          0.19          1.45 1.01          0.99          
1997-2010
(whole period of Labour)
1997-2007
(up until the Great Recession)
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ends up above all other countries shows in graphical form what was already revealed in the 
numbers in Table 1. The fall in GDP per capita in the Great Recession is evident in all 
countries, but appears particularly large in the UK. Figure 1 also shows that the UK grew 
faster than its peers in the 1979-1997 period. Under the Conservative period UK per capita 
GDP growth was similar to the US and significantly stronger than French growth (we do not 
have a consistent series for Germany because of re-unification after 1989).  
Figure 1: Trends in real GDP per capita (adult) relative to 1997  
 
Notes: Analysis based on OECD data (extracted on 28 Oct 2011 from OECD.Stat). GDP is US$, constant prices, 
constant PPPs, OECD base year (2005) from GDP database. Adult refers to “working age adults”, obtained from 
US Bureau of Labour Force Statistics, and includes the civilian non-institutional population aged over 16. Data 
for Unified Germany from 1991. For each country the logged series is set to zero in 1997, so the level of the line 
in any year indicates the cumulative growth rate (e.g. a value of 0.1 in 2001 indicates that the series has grown 
by exp(0.1)-1=10% between 1997 and 2001). The steeper the slope of the line, the faster growth has been over 
that period. 
As discussed earlier, GDP per capita can be decomposed into productivity growth and labour 
market performance. As an accounting identity, GDP per capita = GDP per employee 
(productivity) x employees per capita (the employment rate). An alternative decomposition is 
GDP per capita = GDP per hour x hours per capita. GDP per hour is a better measure of 
productivity than per worker because it accounts for part-time work, the fact that some 
workers may hold multiple jobs and differences in hours worked due to 
holidays/sickness/maternity etc. (although hours are harder to measure accurately). Higher 
employment rates are easier to interpret as a desirable social outcome than higher hours per 
capita, however, as - all else equal - workers would prefer more vacations and a shorter 
working day. Given the ambiguity of which decomposition is “better”, we present both. 
Figure 2 presents the first decomposition using GDP per worker as a measure of productivity. 
Panel A shows that the UK’s GDP per worker growth was as fast as that in the US between 
1997 and 2008 which is impressive as these are the years of the US “productivity miracle” 
(Jorgenson, 2001). So the UK managed to hold the tail of the US tiger. US productivity has 
outstripped that in the UK in the Great Recession which reflects the much more aggressive 
job shedding in the US in response to the downturn. UK productivity growth was better than 
Continental Europe, however. Again, the UK productivity performance was also strong in the 
pre-1997 period – in fact, during the 1979-1997 - under the Conservatives - UK GDP per 
worker grew faster than both the US and France. 
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Panel B of Figure 2 shows employment rates. Over the period 1997-2007 the growth of the 
employment rate in the UK was similar to that in France and Germany. The US, by contrast 
had a very poor jobs performance with the employment rate falling by nearly 5% by 2008 
before plummeting in the Great Recession. This is reflected in the fact that US 
unemployment rates rose from 5% to almost 10% whereas in the UK the increase in 
unemployment was more modest (currently about 8%) despite a larger fall in GDP. In 
Germany, unemployment has hardly risen at all. The UK’s employment rate was similar at 
the beginning and at end of the Conservative period, not rising like in the US, but not falling 
like in France. What is more striking is how volatile the jobs market was, with a huge boom 
in the late 1980s and busts in the early 1980s and early 1990s. Figure 3 repeats the analysis 
for productivity measured in hours instead of workers and shows broadly similar trends to 
Figure 2. In general, the UK productivity position looks weaker compared to the EU on a per 
hour basis as UK hours per worker are higher. For example, although Figure 2 showed that 
UK GDP per worker both pre and post Labour was faster than France, Figure 3 shows that 
France had faster growth of GDP per hour than the UK in the Conservative period.  
This analysis gives a fairly clear story of Britain’s performance under Labour. GDP per 
capita outstripped the other major economies because the UK did well in terms of both 
productivity (only a little worse than the US and better than EU) and the labour market (better 
than the US and only a little worse than the EU). This was a solid performance, contrary to 
what general discussion about the period suggests. However, it is also true that the UK also 
did well in terms of productivity in the Conservative years of 1979-1997, so the UK 
performance is more likely a continuation of a post 1979 trend rather than a sharp break with 
the past. Taking an even longer run perspective we see in Table A5 that 1979 appeared to be 
a break in the UK’s declining relative performance. For example, German GDP per head was 
58% of the UK level in 1870 and American productivity 77%. Just over a century later (1979) 
Germany had 16% higher productivity than the UK and he US was 43% higher. By 2007, 
however, the UK had closed all the gap with Germany and was only 33% behind the US. 
In Appendix 1 we consider Britain’s relative economic performance in greater detail3. When 
the US is used as a benchmark, GDP per capita caught up more quickly under Labour than 
under the Conservatives (because of better labour market performance). By contrast, when 
France is used as a benchmark, GDP per capita caught up more quickly under the 
Conservatives. The main point, however, is that Britain did well in its macroeconomic 
performance compared to its peers throughout the post 1997 period.  
 
                                                 
3
 We note that the growth rates shown in column 1 of Table A.1 and A.3. do not correspond exactly to the GDP 
per adult growth rates in Table 1. This is because in the appendices, these are calculated using a linear 
regression of the log of the series on a time trend and a constant. Table 1 reports cumulative annual growth rates 
which use the start and end year only. 
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Figure 2: Trends in real GDP per worker and employment per capita (adult) relative to 
1997 
Panel A: GDP per employee, Panel B: Employment per capita 
 
 
Notes: Analysis based on OECD data (extracted on 28 Oct 2011 from OECD.Stat). GDP is US$, constant prices, 
constant PPPs, OECD base year (2005) from GDP database. Employment data from OECD productivity 
database. Adult refers to “working age adults”, obtained from US Bureau of Labour Force Statistics, and 
includes the civilian non-institutional population aged over 16. Data for Unified Germany from 1991. Workers 
are all persons engaged. For each country the logged series is set to zero in 1997, so the level of the line in any 
year indicates the cumulative growth rate (e.g. a value of 0.1 in 2001 indicates that the series has grown by 
exp(0.10)-1=11% between 1997 and 2001). The steeper the slope of the line, the faster growth has been over 
that period. 
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Figure 3: Trends in real GDP per hour and hours per capita (adult) relative to 1997 
Panel A: GDP per hour, Panel B: Hours per capita 
 
 
Notes: Analysis based on OECD data (extracted on 28 Oct 2011 from OECD.Stat). GDP is US$, constant prices, 
constant PPPs, OECD base year (2005) from GDP database. Hours data from OECD productivity database. 
Adult refers to “working age adults”, obtained from US Bureau of Labour Force Statistics, and includes the 
civilian non-institutional population aged over 16. Data for Unified Germany from 1991. Total hours are those 
worked by all persons engaged. For each country the logged series is set to zero in 1997, so the level of the line 
in any year indicates the cumulative growth rate (e.g. a value of 0.1 in 2001 indicates that the series has grown 
by exp(0.1)-1=11% between 1997 and 2001). The steeper the slope of the line, the faster growth has been over 
that period. 
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1.3 Where Did the Growth in UK Productivity Come From?  
Introduction 
We now turn to the exercise of accounting for what lies beneath these aggregate trends in UK 
productivity. Rigorous and comparable cross-national data at the industry level is not 
currently available after 2008, so we first focus on the period up until the Great Recession 
(Section 4 analyses the Great Recession period using the most recent available UK data and 
is, by necessity, more provisional). For these purposes we use the KLEMS database
4
 
(Timmer, 2007), which is the best available source of harmonised productivity data (at the 
time of writing, October 2011) for the major countries that we want to look at. It is consistent 
with national accounts, describes all assumptions made and contains comparable data on 
education by industry (which is important for labour quality measurement)
5
.  
We consider two ways to decompose growth. First, we look at the contributions of the “factor 
inputs” to growth – i.e. the quantity and quality of capital and labour. Second, we examine 
the contributions of various industries to the aggregate productivity performance of the UK 
and its key comparators. Broadly we find that during Labour’s period, overall labour 
productivity growth was similar to that in the previous Conservative period, but its 
composition changed – human capital and ICT (information and communication technologies) 
accounted for more of the growth. Low tech capital became less important and overall 
efficiency growth (called “Total Factor Productivity” or TFP) remained at about 1% 
throughout. Perhaps the most striking fact we will discuss is that looking at sectors, finance 
was not responsible for much productivity growth (around 14%), implying that finance was 
unlikely to be the main cause of the strong productivity performance
6
.  
Decomposing growth into factor inputs: The growing importance of skills and computer 
technologies  
A full growth accounting exercise for the UK’s total economy, split into main sectors is 
present in Appendix 2  (the same analysis is reproduced for the US for comparison). We 
summarize the results in this sub-section primarily focusing on the “market economy” as 
defined by KLEMS, which strips out the public sector and real estate. For the public sector, 
value added is particularly hard to measure (we discuss these non-market economy sectors 
below), and international comparisons are therefore problematic. Real estate is excluded 
because output in this industry mostly reflects imputed housing rents rather than the sales of 
firms, consequently residential buildings are also excluded from the market economy capital 
stock (Timmer et al., 2010).  In the UK, the market economy makes up around three quarters 
of the total economy, slightly less in the comparator countries (see Figure 4).  Carrying out 
                                                 
4
 This is available at http://www.euklems.net/. See O'MAHONY, M. & TIMMER, M. P. 2009. Output, Input 
and Productivity Measures at the Industry Level: The EU KLEMS Database. Economic Journal, 119, F374-
F403. 
5
 The OECD also has a similar database, STAN, but this does not include education data and it is harder to track 
through some of the assumptions used (and how they have changed over time). We use the 1.0 version because 
the 2.0 version of KLEMs is still under construction. 
6
 Furthermore, it is worth noting that the aggregate GDP growth numbers are not affected by mis-measurement 
of the output of the investment banks “toxic assets” (such as Mortgage Backed Securities, CDO2, etc.). This is 
because national accounts look at annual growth using an expenditure-based GDP rather than the output-based 
measure of GDP. The “toxic rubbish” part of the banking sector are all classified as intermediate inputs sold to 
non-financial businesses, so do not really show up as GDP. The exception is net exports where “toxic rubbish” 
could show up. But this is in total only 1.5% of GDP, so even this would make only a minor contribution to 
growth even if all of the net exports could be placed in this category.  The contribution of finance to GDP is 
from plain vanilla banking services sold to households. 
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this analysis for Gross Value Added
7
 (GVA) as our measure of output, we find that a similar 
picture of strong UK performance emerges as with the GDP numbers in Table 1.  
Figure 4 shows how aggregate value added splits between different sectors since 1979. In all 
countries, there has been a strong trend away from manufacturing and other goods producing 
sectors and towards services. But this trend is particularly strong in the UK with a shift 
towards business services (its share of aggregate value added rises from 7% to 13%). 
Figure 4: Sector shares of total economy GVA 
 
Notes: Data: EU KLEMS. EU represents all EU-15 countries for which growth accounting could be performed, 
i.e. AUT, BEL, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GER, ITA, NLD & UK. Data for France and the EU are available from 
1981 onwards. Market economy only. 
Significantly, Figure 4 shows that the growth in the public sector, finance and real estate 
sectors between the Conservative and the Labour periods has been less than often imagined. 
Financial intermediation is about 6% of aggregate value added in both periods and the public 
sector (public administration, health and education) also remains constant at 18% of value 
added. Real estate activities have grown, but only from 5% to 8%. According to Figure 4 the 
size of the market economy was only three percentage points smaller under Labour that in the 
previous period. This fall was less than in France (4 percentage point fall) but more than in 
the US and EU as a whole (1 percentage point fall). 
We now focus on the market economy. Table 2 shows a decomposition of average annual 
growth in value added showing that the UK enjoyed overall growth of 3.2% over 1997-2007 
only slightly behind the US (3.4%), and much faster than the EU average (2.5%) and France 
(2.6%). In addition, this was faster than the pre-1997 period, when the average annual growth 
rate was 2.3%. However, this performance was largely due to the contribution of total hours 
worked (driven by rising employment). If we strip out the contribution of hours to UK growth 
                                                 
7
 GVA + taxes on products - subsidies on products = GDP 
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of 0.4%, we are left with labour productivity growth of 2.8%, very similar to the pre-1997 
period of 2.7%. 
Despite this constancy on the surface, the composition of UK productivity growth changed 
between the two periods. The contribution of each factor input is the product of growth in 
that input and its share in value added, while the contribution of TFP (Total Factor 
Productivity – a measure of technical change) is calculated as a residual. The labour 
composition index takes into account differences in the composition of the workforce in 
terms of skills, gender and age
8
.  
The numbers are detailed in Table 2 and shown graphically in Figure 5. Although TFP 
growth was similar at about 1% p.a in both periods, the contribution of labour composition 
and ICT capital increased in importance post 1997 and the contribution of non-ICT capital 
has fallen. Overall, contribution from the “knowledge economy” (labour composition, ICT 
capital and TFP) has increased in the UK from 2 to 2.3%, compared to a fall in the EU and a 
larger increase in US driven mainly by higher TFP growth
9
.  
Table 2: Decomposition of growth in value added, market economy 
 
Notes: Data: EU KLEMS. EU represents all EU-15 countries for which growth accounting could be performed, 
i.e. AUT, BEL, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GER, ITA, NLD & UK. Data for France and EU are available from 1981 
onwards. 
                                                 
8
 See O'MAHONY, M. & TIMMER, M. P. 2009. Output, Input and Productivity Measures at the Industry 
Level: The EU KLEMS Database. Economic Journal, 119, F374-F403. This explains the construction of the 
labour composition component in EU KLEMS, which depends on skills (measured by educational attainment), 
age and sex of the workforce. Timmer et al (2010) explain that the impact of an ageing population (which 
implies higher wage workers) and the increasing employment of females (who tend to be paid less) tend to 
counterbalance each other. Hence trends in labour composition tend to be dominated by changes in skill 
composition. 
9
 Timmer et al (2007) note that while the use of educational attainment as a measure of skill may lead to 
difficulties with cross-country comparisons (since educational systems, classifications and quality vary between 
countries), it is useful for tracking developments over time within the same country. 
1979-1997 1997-2007 1979-1997 1997-2007 1979-1997 1997-2007 1979-1997 1997-2007
1 Market economy output (2+3) 2.3 3.2 2.1 2.5 3.2 3.4 1.8 2.6
2 Hours worked -0.4 0.4 -0.2 0.5 0.9 0.5 -0.4 0.4
3 Labour productivity (4+5+6+7) 2.7 2.8 2.3 2.0 2.2 2.9 2.2 2.2
Contributions from
4 Labour composition 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3
5 ICT capital per hour 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.4
6 Non ICT capital per hour 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.5
7 TFP 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.4 1.2 1.1 1.0
8
Contribution from knowledge 
economy (4+5+7) 2.0 2.3 1.6 1.4 1.5 2.5 1.8 1.6
UK EU US France
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Figure 5: Sources of labour productivity growth, market economy 
 
Notes: Data: EU KLEMS. EU represents all EU-15 countries for which growth accounting could be performed, 
i.e. AUT, BEL, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GER, ITA, NLD & UK. Data for France and EU are available from 1981 
onwards. ICT = Information and Communication Technology and TFP = Total Factor Productivity.  
Which sectors are responsible for productivity growth? It wasn’t all a financial bubble 
The second growth decomposition we implement is to look at the contribution of different 
sectors to aggregate productivity. Appendix 2 shows the full growth accounting exercise by 
sector. This shows that the highest productivity growth sectors over the 1997-2007 period 
were electrical machinery, post and communication, financial intermediation, business 
services and distribution (in descending order).  These sectors saw high contributions from 
both ICT capital per hour and TFP. 
However, a sector’s contribution to overall market economy productivity growth depends on 
both its productivity growth and its size (share of total market economy GVA). Nationwide 
aggregate productivity growth can increase either because a sector increases productivity 
(“within effect”) or a high productivity sector grows in size at the expense of a low 
productivity sector (“between effect”). Figure 6 shows the breakdown by broad sector, 
calculated by multiplying the average productivity growth of a sector by its average share in 
GVA over the corresponding period (the calculations underlying this are present in Appendix 
3, Table A.8)
10
. Interestingly, financial intermediation was responsible for only 0.4 
percentage points of the 2.8 percentage points annual growth in productivity under Labour. 
Accounting for 14% (= 100*0.4/2.8) of productivity growth with only 9% of the market 
economy value added is no small achievement, but this sector already accounted for 0.2 
percentage points of the growth under the Conservatives (when it constituted 8% of market 
                                                 
10
 We note that we are using a methodology that is consistent with the use of KLEMS data in Timmer et al 
(2010), Van Ark et al (2008) and Timmer et al (2007) who look at the periods 1980-1995 and 1995-2004 or 
2005. Using a different approach, and apportioning GVA growth to sectors over 2000-2007, Dal Borgo et al 
(2011), find similar results in terms of the relative contributions of the different sectors to aggregate VA growth. 
Of the total growth of 2.83%, 0.31p.p relates to financial services, with larger contributions coming from 
Distribution (0.88p.p) and Business Services (0.55p.p).  See  DAL BORGO, M., GOODRIDGE, P., HASKEL, J. 
E. & PESOLE, A. 2011. Productivity and Growth in UK Industries: An Intangible Investment Approach. 
Imperial College. 
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economy value added). And this leaves 86% of aggregate market economy growth due to 
other sectors. Further, the contribution of finance also increased in other economies: its 
contribution more than doubled in the US over the same periods (from 0.2 to 0.5) and 
doubled in the EU as a whole (0.1 to 0.2).  So the idea that all of the productivity growth in 
the UK relative to others was due to a bubble in finance does not seem to square with this 
evidence. Furthermore, if we exclude the effect of finance altogether, productivity growth in 
the UK would have been broadly constant at around 2.5% per annum in the pre and post-
1997 periods
11
. 
Figure 6: Sector contributions to market economy productivity growth  
 
Notes: Analysis based on EU KLEMS data. EU represents all EU-15 countries for which growth accounting 
could be performed, i.e. AUT, BEL, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GER, ITA, NLD & UK.  Data for France and EU 
are available from 1981 onwards. Average sectoral growth rates for the periods 1979-1997 and 1997-2007 are 
weighted by each sector’s average share in market economy nominal GVA over the relevant period. The 
reallocation effect refers to the labour productivity effects of reallocations of labour between sectors that have 
different productivity levels. 
Although the productivity growth performance does not seem directly attributable to the 
“bubble” sectors of finance, property and the public sector, there could be some other indirect 
mechanism. Could productivity in business services, for example, all be driven by the 
demands from financial services?  This seems somewhat unlikely, as many parts of business 
services (e.g. consultancy and legal) are serving primarily non-financial firms. A more subtle 
argument is that the financial bubble created a kind of unsustainable excess consumption 
                                                 
11
 Note that we weight the sector contributions to productivity growth using nominal GVA to be consistent with 
the KLEMS growth accounting methodology. We also experimented with weighting by GVA share in constant 
prices, and by share of employment (not reported here). The picture does not change much and business services 
remain the sector with the largest increase in contribution between the pre and post-1997 periods. When we use 
constant prices GVA, we see that electrical machinery, post and communication, a sector that has seen 
productivity gains of 7.2% (Appendix 2), makes a larger contribution, due to the fact that prices in the sub-
sectors have fallen in recent years (following technology improvements and the impact of competition and 
regulation in the telecoms and postal sectors) and hence a smaller share in current price GVA compared to 
constant price GVA. When we use sector shares in employment we see that electrical machinery, post and 
communication makes a much smaller contribution as these are not labour  intensive sectors.  
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demand that was propping up fundamentally inefficient companies. However, (Giles, 2011c) 
shows that the data does not support the assertion that there was a great consumer boom 
before the financial crisis. In fact, there was a drop in household consumption as a share of 
national income, from 63.3% in 2002 to 61.3% in 2007. Furthermore, even if this 
consumption bubble story were true, it is unlikely that this would artificially inflate 
productivity. A general bubble would increase output and employment hours (temporarily) 
above their sustainable levels. But it is unclear why this would flatter the productivity 
numbers. In fact, if generally unproductive activities were being drawn in, this would be 
more likely to lower measured productivity. 
We return to this issue in Section 4 when evaluating the situation of the economy since 2008. 
The role of non-market sectors 
Our focus has been on the market economy, but one could also perform a growth accounting 
exercise for health, education, public administration activities and real estate (see Appendix 
2). This is unlikely to be very reliable because output is extremely hard to measure in these 
primarily public service activities (Timmer et al., 2010) with productivity growth assumed to 
be zero in most sectors and in most countries. Nevertheless taking this for a moment at face 
value, we find that UK output growth in the non-market sectors was greater in the Labour 
period than under the Conservatives, but that labour productivity growth fell from 0.6% pa to 
zero. Other EU countries also experienced a decline (but not the US). This appears to be 
largely due to negative TFP growth which affected all countries but was strongest in the UK 
(see Table 3).  
This is consistent with the story that the large increase in public services expenditures led to a 
fall in productivity in these sectors. For example, even after improvements in measurement 
following the Atkinson Review (2005), NHS productivity appears to be at best flat. 
Undoubtedly, low productivity in the public sector is a major problem and there is much 
debate over whether Labour’s much-delayed reforms to public services had any effect on 
efficiency. We discuss public sector productivity in more detail in Section 5 and show some 
evidence that some of the reforms did raise productivity (e.g. in healthcare).Nonetheless, as 
we discussed in the first section even including (measured) public services, aggregate 
productivity performance of the UK was second only to the US since 1997. 
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Table 3: Decomposition of growth in value added, public admin, education and health 
 
Notes: Data: EU KLEMS. EU represents all EU-15 countries for which growth accounting could be performed, 
i.e. AUT, BEL, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GER, ITA, NLD & UK. Data for France and EU are available from 1981 
onwards. 
Productivity levels 
Although the UK’s overall productivity growth has been strong, it is worth recalling that 
productivity in terms of levels still lags behind other countries despite the gap narrowing 
since the early 1990s. Over the 2000s, UK GDP per hour worked was 17% below the US in 
2010, 14% lower than France and 12% lower than Germany (see Figure 7).  
Figure 7: Labour productivity levels, GDP per hour, average over 2000-2010 (2005 
$ PPP) 
 
Notes: Analysis based on OECD data (extracted on 28 Oct 2011 from OECD.Stat). GDP from GDP database, 
hours data from OECD productivity database. GDP is US$, constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base year 
(2005). 
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1.4 Summary on Overall UK Economic Performance since 1997 
Since 1997 UK economic performance has been strong compared to other countries, and this 
continues a historical trend which began after 1979 with Mrs Thatcher. GDP per capita grew 
faster than the other G6 nations between 1997 and 2010 with productivity growth second to 
only the American “productivity miracle”. This UK performance was due to a continued 
rapid rate of TFP growth and an increasingly important role for skills and ICT. Importantly, 
the performance was not primarily driven by finance which contributed only around 0.4% of 
the 2.8% productivity growth in the market sector during the Labour period (compared to 0.2% 
of the 2.7% productivity growth under the Conservatives). Business services and distribution 
were much more important sectors. The growth in hours in the non-market sector due to 
rising government expenditure and a property boom held aggregate productivity back, but not 
enough to make much of a change in Britain’s relative growth position (see Table 1). 
2. Other Measures of Business Performance 
2.1 Introduction 
We have focused on productivity because, for economists, this is the key measure of long-run 
performance. In this section we present a short tour of other indicators of business 
performance (including regional inequality). This is more of a mixed bag, but overall our 
sense is that these alternative indicators support a continuation of the positive trends in 
business performance since 1997, but with many remaining problems of the levels of 
performance relative to other countries. We investigate investment (domestic and foreign 
direct), innovation, management, skills, entrepreneurship, exports, profits and regional 
differences. Data constraints prevent us from implementing the fully consistent analysis of all 
of these performance measures of the UK relative to other countries before and after Labour, 
but we use the data available where we can.  
2.2 Analysis of Key Indicators 
Investment 
In sub-section 1.3 we showed the importance of investments in ICT and non ICT capital to 
productivity growth. The contribution of ICT capital to growth was nearly as high in the UK 
as in the US (and higher than the EU), and the contribution of non-ICT capital in the UK was 
the same as the US in both the pre and post-1997 periods. However, when we look at the 
levels of total investment, standardised as a percentage of value added, UK levels are 
consistently lower than France and Germany, but similar to the US (Figure 8). In the post-
1997 period, average UK investment was 17.9% of value added compared to 18.7% in the US, 
21.8% in France and 22.1% in Germany.  
19 
 
Figure 8: Total economy investment as a share of GVA (%) 
 
Notes: OECD STAN database. Investment intensity is calculated as the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to 
value added. 
The more favourable performance of the UK in the late 1980s was mainly driven by real 
estate during the Lawson boom as shown by Figure 9, which gives the sector breakdown of 
total investment.  Indeed, the largest share for the most part has related to real estate
12
.  
                                                 
12
 The split between real estate and renting and business activities is only available from the early 1990s, but 
most of this overall investment consists of real estate activity. 
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Figure 9: Sector shares of total investment (%)  
 
Notes: OECD STAN database. Investment share represents investment composition of the total economy. It is 
calculated by dividing each industry's gross fixed capital formation by gross fixed capital formation for the total 
economy. 
The classic interpretation problem with investment is whether it is “too low” in the Anglo-
Saxon countries because of access to finance, short-termism, low public investment or “too 
high” in Continental Europe due to (for example) high minimum wages and union bargaining 
power. In either case, things have not changed much over time. 
Foreign Direct Investment  
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) may be important for two reasons. First, it is a signal of the 
success of the UK in attracting overseas firms. Second, FDI may bring new technologies and 
modern management practices as well as stimulating greater competition (Bloom et al., 
2011b). These mechanisms mean that FDI may create positive spillovers raising the 
productivity of domestic firms
13
.  
The UK has been successful at attracting FDI, with inward FDI stocks higher than 
comparators both pre and post-1997 as shown in Figure 10 (unfortunately, OECD data is not 
available on a consistent basis pre 1990). All countries shown have grown between 1997 and 
2010, with Germany showing the highest cumulative annual growth rate of 10%, compared to 
7% for the UK. The relative acceleration witnessed in the UK, France and Germany may be 
due to the effects of European integration since the mid-1990s (the growth in US FDI stocks 
has been constant). UK FDI inflows appeared to be strongly pro-cyclical, picking up from 
                                                 
13
 The evidence on FDI spillovers is mixed (see HASKEL, J. E., PEREIRA, S. C. & SLAUGHTER, M. J. 2007. 
Does inward foreign direct investment boost the productivity of domestic firms? Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 89, 482-496.) 
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1997, reaching a peak of 8% of GDP in 2000 during the “dot com boom” before falling back 
to pre-1997 levels until another peak in the mid-2000s (see Figure 11)
14
.  
Figure 10: Inward FDI stocks (% GDP) 
 
Notes: Analysis based on OECD data sourced from www.oecd.org/investment/statistics 
Figure 11: FDI Inflows (% GDP) 
 
Notes: Analysis based on OECD data sourced from www.oecd.org/investment/statistics 
                                                 
14
 Outward FDI followed a similar pattern to inward FDI. The UK had higher outward FDI stocks than its 
comparators since the early 1990s, and these began to accelerate for the European countries. France saw the 
highest CAGR since 1997 of 10%, compared with 8% for the UK. FDI outflows follow a pro-cyclical pattern, 
with a peak of 16% of GDP in 2000, and another peak of nearly 12% of GDP just before the Great Recession.  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Germany
France
UK
US
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
Germany
France
UK
US
22 
 
Innovation  
A standard measure of innovative inputs is R&D (business financed R&D makes up 62% of 
the total in the UK (BIS, 2010a)). R&D has increased slightly as a proportion of GDP 
between 1997 and 2008 after falling steadily since the late 1970s (Van Reenen, 1997). Still at 
1.8% the ratio is lower than other major developed countries (see Figure 12). Similarly, the 
UK lags behind the US and Germany with respect to patents granted, though it has been 
tracking France since the 1990s (see Figure 13). 
Figure 12: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) (% GDP) 
 
Notes: Analysis based on OECD MSTI June 2010 (data not available on a consistent basic prior to 1981) 
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Figure 13: USPTO patents granted, per million of the population 
 
Notes: Data on patents granted from US Patent and Trade Mark Office, population data from OECD. 
A wider view of intangibles should also be considered. These are difficult to measure and to 
compare across countries. On one set of recent data the inclusion of intangibles indicates that 
the UK had a higher share of value added in intangibles than all other G7 nations (BIS, 
2010c). In addition to “traditional innovation” which refers to R&D, design and IP; “software 
development” and “economic competencies” are included (the latter comprises training, 
organisational development, marketing and branding). Capturing the intangibles gives a 
better view of the service sector’s investment on innovation that is probably understated in 
the traditional Frascati-based measures of R&D. Other sources of intangible data however 
show the UK in a less favourable light compared to other countries (e.g. some OECD data).  
Intangible investment has been increasing over time (Figure 14). Nominal investments in 
intangibles have increased faster than tangible assets: the gap between these different types of 
investments has widened since 1998 such that by 2008 investments in intangibles were £34 
billion higher than those of tangibles. We note however, that intangible investment as a share 
of market output (excluding government) remained broadly stable in recent years, as has its 
composition (Figure 15).  
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Figure 14: Investment by UK firms in intangible and tangible assets, 1990-2008 
 
Notes: NESTA/BIS Annual Innovation Report 2010.  
Figure 15: Investment by UK firms in intangible assets by category – share of market 
sector GVA, 1990-2008 
 
Notes: NESTA/BIS Annual Innovation Report 2010.  
Management  
Management is believed to be an important factor in raising productivity and the UK is 
generally perceived to have a deficit of quality compared with some other leading nations. 
This perception may just be based on the popularity of British exports of TV programmes 
showcasing poor managers in “The Office” and Fawlty Towers”, of course. It is very difficult 
to credibly measure management practices, but Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), (2010) have 
recently developed techniques to gauge some important aspects of it related to monitoring, 
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targets and incentives management practices. The latest version of their database covers 20 
countries including the UK.  
In terms of average management scores, the UK is in the middle of the pack, similar to Italy 
and France but significantly below the “Premier League” of nations lead by the US, but also 
including Japan and Germany (Figure 16). Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) show that the 
UK’s management gap with the US is accounted for by the preponderance of family firms, 
lower human capital and weaker competition. 
Unfortunately, the time series of their management data is too short to examine the whole of 
the 1997-2010 period. However, there did appear to be some catching up with the US over 
the 2004-2010 period on management scores (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010).  
Figure 16: Average management quality across countries 
 
Notes: Analysis from Bloom and Van Reenen (2010). Average score across 18 questions. 
Education and Skills 
Public investment on education increased in the UK between 1995 and 2007, from 5% to 5.4% 
of GDP (see Table 4). In 2007, public expenditure on education in the UK exceeded that in 
the US (5.3%) and Germany (4.5%) and was just below France (5.6%).  
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Table 4: Public expenditure on education as a percentage of total GDP (% total public 
expenditure) 
  1995 2000 2007 
UK 5.0 (11.4) 4.3 (11.0) 5.4 (11.7) 
US 4.7 (12.6) 4.9 (14.4) 5.3 (14.1) 
Germany 4.6 (8.5) 4.4 (9.8) 4.5 (10.3) 
France 6.3 (11) 6.0 (12.5) 5.6 (12.5) 
Notes: Expenditure on educational institutions as a percentage of GDP, reproduced from IPPR (Lent and Nash, 
2011) based on OECD Education at a glance data. Note that Public expenditure presented here includes 
subsidies to households for living costs (scholarships and grants to students/households and students loans). 
Since 1997, the proportion of tertiary (or post-secondary school) educated adults rose from 23% 
to 33% in the UK, representing an average annual growth rate of 3.2%, which is higher than 
its comparators. In levels, the UK does better than Germany and France with 25% and 27% 
respectively in 2008; however it still lags behind the US where 41% of 25-64 year olds have 
a tertiary education (see Table 5).  
Table 5: Percentage of 25-64 year old population by educational level  
 
Notes: OECD Education at a glance, www.oecd.org/edu/eag2010, See Annex 3 for notes 
(www.oecd.org/edu/eag2010). 
The UK does more poorly with upper secondary and post-secondary, non-tertiary education 
(which tends to represent vocational courses). Only 37% of 25-64 year olds in the UK have 
education of this level, compared with 43%, 48% and 60% in France, US and Germany 
respectively. However, this proportion has risen since 1997, with an average annual growth 
rate of 0.2% (compared with a decline in US and Germany but a greater rise in France). 
Finally, the percentage of 25-64 year olds with below upper secondary education is 30% in 
the UK in 2008 (Table 5). This has fallen from 41% in 1997, at an average annual rate of 
2.7%, representing a faster decline than its comparators. In 2008, the unskilled proportion of 
the workforce in the UK was of a similar level to France, but much higher than in Germany 
(15%) and the US (11%). 
Therefore it appears that since 1997 progress was made, at faster rates than in comparator 
countries. However, given the gap at the beginning of the period, the UK is continuing to lag 
behind its comparators in levels - apart from in tertiary education where the UK is beaten 
only by the US. 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
ave
 growth
UK Below upper secondary 41      40      38      37      37      36      35      34      33      32      32      30      -2.7
Upper secondary and post-
secondary non-tertiary 37      36      37      37      37      37      37      37      37      38      37      37      
0.2
Tertiary education 23      24      25      26      26      27      28      29      30      31      32      33      3.2
US Below upper secondary 14      14      13      13      12      13      12      12      12      12      12      11      -1.8
Upper secondary and post-
secondary non-tertiary 52      52      51      51      50      49      49      49      49      48      48      48      
-0.8
Tertiary education 34      35      36      36      37      38      38      39      39      39      40      41      1.7
Germany Below upper secondary 17      16      19      18      17      17      17      16      17      17      16      15      -1.0
Upper secondary and post-
secondary non-tertiary 61      61      58      58      59      60      59      59      59      59      60      60      
-0.1
Tertiary education 23      23      23      23      23      23      24      25      25      24      24      25      1.0
France Below upper secondary 41      39      38      37      36      35      35      34      33      33      31      30      -2.6
Upper secondary and post-
secondary non-tertiary 39      40      40      41      41      41      41      41      41      41      42      43      
0.6
Tertiary education 20      21      21      22      23      24      24      24      25      26      27      27      2.9
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In terms of vocational skills, the UK is well-known to have problems with apprenticeships 
compared with some European countries like Germany, Austria and Switzerland (Steedman, 
2010). 
Entrepreneurship 
A crude measure of entrepreneurial activity is the number of new firms being registered for 
VAT. Of course, many companies are registered and are actually non-trading entities, for 
example for tax purposes, therefore this measure is imperfect. In aggregate there has been an 
overall rise in registrations, from around 170,000 in 1994 to over 200,000 registrations in 
2007 (see Figure 17). 
Disaggregating total VAT registrations by sector, much of the aggregate rise appears to have 
been driven by “renting and business activities”, the same sector that has made the largest 
contribution to productivity gains since 1997. Within this category, further investigation (not 
reported here) shows that the largest sectors were legal and accounting services, which grew 
consistently over the period and IT/data services for which registrations were also high. 
Figure 17: UK VAT registrations 
Notes: BIS, http://stats.bis.gov.uk/ed/vat/index.htm 
A measure based on survey data, collected by Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, is Total 
Early State Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA). This measures the prevalence of working age 
adults who are either nascent entrepreneurs (about to start up a business) or are working in a 
new firm (defined as the first 42 months since a business was launched). According to this 
data, the UK ranks above average and above Germany and France (though below the US), 
with just over 6% of working age adults involved in entrepreneurial activity (See Figure 18).  
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Figure 18: Total early stage entrepreneurial activity  
 
Notes: Data sourced from Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2010 Global Report, based on a 2009 survey.  Total 
Early Stage Entrepreneurial Activity refers to proportion of working age population involved in starting or 
growing a new business (under 42 months old). 
Exports 
Since the early 1990s, exports as a proportion of GDP have remained around 25-28% in the 
UK, which has been similar to France (see Figure 19).  Exports make up a lower proportion 
of GDP in the US, at around 10-11%. All three countries have seen relatively flat trends. 
However, Germany’s exports have increased from around 25% to nearly 50% of GDP before 
the Great Recession, falling to 40% in 2009.  
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Figure 19: Exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP 
 
Notes: Data sourced from IMF data mapper, balance of payments statistics. 
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php 
In terms of export mix, 41% of UK exports are related to services in 2009 (BIS, 2010b). The 
UK’s share of the world goods export market has declined in recent years, falling from 4 % in 
2000 to 3% in 2009 (BIS, 2010b). With the exception of Germany (whose share increased 
during the same period) other major industrial economies have experienced a similar trend, 
due to the rising shares of emerging economies. However, the UK has increased its share of 
world services exports since 1990, reaching 7% in 2009 (one of the few developed countries 
to do so), and has remained the second (to the US) largest exporter of services.  
The UK’s export and import performance has been rather poor after 2008 despite a huge 
devaluation of sterling. We discuss this in more detail in Section 4. 
Profitability 
While economists and policy makers measure focus on productivity, businesses themselves 
naturally focus on their bottom line. Profitability is rather an ambiguous indicator from a 
welfare point of view as it might rise for positive reasons (e.g. innovation) or negative ones 
(e.g. monopoly power). 
Data from the ONS gives a time series of profitability measured as net operating profits over 
net capital employed. Figure 20 splits UK Continental Shelf (UKCS), which refers to North 
Sea Oil, from all other private non-financial institutions. While UKCS profitability has 
tended to track the oil price, Non-UKCS profits have been relatively flat at around 10-15% 
over the period since 1989 for which data are available.  There is no evidence of any 
systematic decline under Labour. 
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Figure 20: Annual net rates of return of private non-financial corporations, UKCS and 
non UKCS split 
 
Notes: Analysis based on ONS data. UKCS refers to UK Continental Shelf, North Sea Oil production. Non 
UKCS consists of manufacturing, services, construction, electricity and gas, agriculture, mining, quarrying etc. 
The ONS splits Non-UKCS companies between services and manufacturing, as shown in 
Figure 21. Here we see that profitability in both services and manufacturing appeared to peak 
around 1997. Interestingly, the decline in manufacturing margins post-1997 coinciding with a 
strong value of Sterling, and increasing competition from globalisation which puts downward 
pressure on margins. The margin seems to have settled around 10% from the early 2000s 
until the Great Recession. Services margins fluctuated at a higher level, with an average of 17% 
over the period 1997 to 2008, dropping off again during the recession. 
Analysis of the share of profits in national income also shows considerable stability in the 
UK over time (Pessoa and Van Reenen, 2011). 
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Figure 21: Annual net rates of return of private non-financial corporations, services and 
manufacturing split 
 
Notes: Analysis based on ONS data, net operating surplus divided by net average capital employed. 
2.3 Regional Disparities 
Regional disparities are often said to be a major problem for the UK and a cause not only of 
social concern but of worse overall performance. In particular it is thought that London’s 
dominance over England (and the other three countries) “holds back” the UK. These claims 
need to be given some thought.  Inequality can certainly be a moral concern, especially as this 
has grown dramatically since 1979 (Machin and Van Reenen, 2010). But it is ultimately 
inequality between individuals or households which is the main concern, not between areas 
per se. Since only a very small amount of the inequality between people appears to be 
accounted for by their region, it is hard to see why spatial inequalities should get as high a 
weight vis-à-vis individual  and household inequality as they do (except for politicians whose 
constituencies are geographically based).  
Since our focus in this report is on aggregate performance rather than distribution, a regional 
analysis would be relevant if it were the case that regional inequality was a causal influence 
on slower growth. But the evidence is that greater equality across places is consistent with 
faster and slower aggregate growth: there is no well-founded empirical or theoretical 
relationship. On the other hand, if growth is exclusively in one area (London and the South 
East), we can get situations of excess demand for labour and assets which can push up 
equilibrium unemployment (NAIRU). In addition, much literature on the benefits of 
agglomeration show that cities should be the engines of growth and the UK’s failure –
especially in the 1980s - to have strongly growing cities outside London cannot have helped 
in efforts to secure growth and productivity.  
With this in mind, what are the facts? 
UK regions are unequal 
UK regions, cities and neighbourhoods appear unequal under a number of measures: average 
earnings, employment, and many other socio-economic outcomes. In terms of Gross-Value-
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Added per head, the top ranked 10% of UK (NUTS3 level
15
) regions   have value added at 
least 50% higher than the bottom ranked 10% (SERC, 2011). Similarly, value added per hour 
in 2008 was over 50% higher in London than in Wales.  
Figure 22 presents value added per head, per filled job and per hour at the level of the more 
aggregated (NUTS1) regions. Value added per head shows larger variation due to commuting 
patterns: commuters contribute to London’s output which is then shared between Londoners. 
Therefore, productivity measures give a clearer picture. Value added per hour worked in 
London was at 32% above the UK average in 2009.  
Figure 22: Regional economic indicators by NUTS1 region, 2009 
 
Notes: Data sourced from BIS regional economic performance indicators, based on ONS data. 
Regional inequality persists over time 
Regional inequality in the UK (as measured by wages or productivity) has been very stable 
since 1997. Overman (2010) analyses regional wages (rather than productivity) because (i) 
wages are linked to productivity and (ii) good individual level (micro) data on wages is 
available. The regions analysed are 157 “labour market areas” of which 79 are single “urban” 
travel to work areas  and 78 are “rural areas” over the period 1998-2008. The overall level of 
between area wage disparities has remained roughly constant during the period. Figure 23 
shows average wages in 2008 plotted against average wages in 1998. Wages are normalised 
by dividing by the year average. 
                                                 
15
 The NUTS classification is a hierarchical system for dividing up the economic territory of the EU for the 
purpose of regional analysis and policy. NUTS 1 are the major socio-economic regions, NUTS 2: basic regions 
for the application of regional policies and NUTS 3 are small regions for specific diagnoses. For further detail 
see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction 
33 
 
Figure 23: Normalised hourly wage in 1998 and 2008 across 157 areas 
 
Notes: SERC (2010), graph plots average area wage in 1998 against average area wage in 2008 (expressed as a 
ratio to the UK average) 
If relative average area wages were completely persistent across time the dots would sit on 
the 45 degree line. The dashed line (which shows the results from regressing 2008 normalised 
wages on 1998 normalised wages) shows this is not quite the case. On average, the lowest 
wages areas have caught up slightly, while the highest wages areas have fallen back although 
the effect is not very pronounced. Further, it appears that this 'churning' tendency amongst the 
rankings is not being driven by the highest wage areas which tend, if anything, to have seen 
their position improve (as they mainly sit above the 45 degree line).  
To what extent do these disparities arise because of differences in the types of workers in 
different areas (sorting) versus different outcomes for the same types of workers in different 
areas (area effects)? Empirically, most of this wage disparity across areas is due to individual 
characteristics – i.e. who you are turns to be is more important than where you live. 
Regional disparities in the UK are larger than other EU countries 
The UK does seem to have somewhat greater inequality between regions than other countries, 
primarily because of the success of London. This is shown in Figure 24: compared to other 
EU15 countries, the UK is second only to Ireland in terms of the average regional difference 
from national GDP per capita. 
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Figure 24: Dispersion of regional GVA per capita (average regional difference from 
national GDP per capita (%) in 2007) 
 
Notes: Eurostat data on EU15 minus Luxembourg 
Summary on regional differences 
London has higher productivity and wages than other UK regions and this regional disparity 
is greater than most other countries. Most spatial inequality of wages is between individuals 
rather than regions (or more disaggregated areas) and most of this is due to individual 
characteristics rather than space-based “agglomeration” effects. In other words, the higher 
wages in London are mainly because more productive people live and work in London rather 
than because London somehow makes everyone who works there more productive.  
The spatial distribution has been reasonably stable despite a lot of policies to try and get other 
regions growing faster than London since 1997. How much of this regional dispersion is an 
economic or ethical problem of an “unbalanced” economy is unclear.  
2.4 Summary on Indicators of Business Performance 
The UK’s economy shows some long-standing problems in terms of the level of business 
performance (e.g. in productivity, innovation and intermediate skills) but also shows some 
sign of improvement in recent years mirroring the productivity improvement. Skills, 
especially for college education have grown rapidly as has ICT investment. R&D intensity 
remains low, but has stopped falling and intangible investments and entrepreneurship seem 
impressive. Investment is lower than in Continental European countries, but FDI remains 
strong. Taken as a whole, these indicators certainly do not suggest that business performance 
and the underpinning requirements for productivity growth deteriorated under Labour since 
1997, and there were clearly some movements in the right direction especially for human 
capital and innovation. 
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3. Was The UK’s Strong Post 1997 Performance Anything to do With 
Labour’s Policies? 
3.1 Introduction 
Our assessment so far suggests that the performance of UK business 1997-2010 was good by 
international standards. UK per capita GDP grew faster than all other major advanced 
countries and only the US had a better productivity growth record. A natural question to ask, 
however, is whether any of this was due to Labour policies? After all, growth may have been 
as fast (or even faster) under the Conservatives or Liberal Democrats. 
Indeed, as noted earlier, the UK’s growth of GDP per adult was about 1.4% p.a. 1997-2010 
compared to 2% p.a. under the Conservatives between 1979 and 1997 (Table A.1). So 
although Labour did better relative to other countries on this measure it did not do better 
relative to the Thatcher-Major years. Similarly hourly productivity growth was 1.7% p.a. 
under Labour compared to 2% p.a. under the Conservatives. The picture looks better for 
Labour (with similar growth rates of around 2% p.a. in both periods as shown in Table A.3) if 
we end in 2007 prior to the Great Recession of course, as productivity has fallen dramatically 
during the recession as a consequence of employment falling less quickly than output. 
One argument is that Labour merely reaped the dividends of structural changes that were 
instituted during the Conservative period – for example, more flexible labour laws, 
privatisation, reductions in government subsidies, some tougher enforcement of welfare 
payments, lower marginal tax rates, and other market-friendly policies take time to bed down. 
The lagged effects of these policy reforms may have boosted productivity in the late 1990s 
and beyond. 
If this were the case Labour could still claim some credit for the glass being “half-full rather 
than half-empty”. The good growth performance of the UK relative to other countries post 
1997 could have been worse had Labour reversed many of the Conservatives’ pro-growth 
policies. Labour did not return to 1970s style high rates of marginal taxation, re-
nationalization or reinstate damaging pro-union laws, for example.  
A deeper point, however, is that although many of the reforms under the Conservatives may 
have increased the level of productivity, it is unlikely that they led to a permanent increase in 
the rate of productivity growth. In order to continue to narrow the productivity gap with other 
countries, continuous reform is likely to be necessary, especially as many other countries 
were also reforming their labour and product markets. Consider union legislation, for 
example. There is a lively debate on whether unions reduce the level of productivity or not. 
Although arguments can be made on either side, it seems likely that 1970s style British 
unionism was a drag on productivity (Metcalf, 2003). Nevertheless, it also seems improbable 
that anti-union laws would have a permanent effect on productivity growth. Unions would 
have to have a seriously negative effect on innovation and there is no compelling evidence of 
this (Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen, 2003). 
3.2 Analysis of Some Specific Policies 
Tying aggregate productivity performance to specific policies is extremely difficult, 
especially as (unfortunately) British governments rarely submit their policies to rigorous 
evaluation and have, for various reasons,  shied away from allowing randomised control trials 
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of business and other policies. Nevertheless, we can analyse several policies in broad scope 
as well as looking in detail at some specific “case studies”16. 
Competition policy 
A robust finding from a host of studies suggests that increases in product market competition 
boost productivity (for example, Nickell (1996) and Blundell et al, (1999) on UK 
productivity; Bloom and Van Reenen, (2007, 2010) on management and Holmes and Schmitz, 
(2010), for a survey). Crafts (2011) argues that the reduction in competitive intensity in the 
inter-war period was a major cause of the relative decline of UK productivity which only 
turned around after pro-competitive reforms were implemented after 1979.  
The importance of competition for improving performance were emphasised by the Treasury, 
Prime Minister and the Chancellor in the Labour years. Several pieces of legislation 
significantly strengthened competition policy. The 1998 Competition Act and the 2002 
Enterprise Act both strengthened the hand of the competition authorities. In particular there 
was an enhanced role and greater autonomy for the Competition Commission, a de-
politicisation of merger reviews and tougher punishments for cartels.  Indices of product 
market liberalization and the quality of competition enforcement regularly place the UK as 
the best in the EU and sometimes the OECD. 
Although demonstrating a link between competition laws and performance improvements is 
challenging (although see Symeonidis (2000)), it seems likely that competition policy has 
helped improve business performance and productivity. Since Labour introduced the most 
serious changes to toughen the competition policy regime this should have boosted 
productivity. 
Human capital 
Education and skills have direct effects on productivity through raising the quality of labour 
inputs. This has been demonstrated in hundreds of studies and is taken for granted in all 
growth accounting (e.g. Sianesi and Van Reenen (2003)). But education may have an effect 
on productivity that is even stronger than would be suggested by conventional growth 
accounting if there are “spillovers” – for example if having more educated people reduces 
crime or enables others to learn more easily. Furthermore, if human capital causes innovation 
as assumed by modern growth theory, then higher levels of education could have permanent 
effects on the growth rate. The evidence for the existence and magnitude of human capital 
spillovers and growth effects is mixed (e.g. Angrist and Acemoglu, (2000)) although recent 
evidence has been encouraging (Moretti, 2003), especially for management education 
(Gennaioli et al., 2011). 
The university system certainly expanded under Labour. Section 2 showed that the proportion 
of university educated people rose much faster than in other countries from under a quarter to 
over a third. Similarly there have been increases in the staying on rates past the compulsory 
schooling age of 16. This has been aided by policies such as the Education Maintenance 
Allowance (EMA) which subsidised young people from low income families to stay on. High 
quality evaluations of this program suggest that the EMA significantly increased participation 
rates (Dearden et al., 2009), and passed a cost-benefit test. Since low income pupils are much 
more likely to drop out before 18, this benefited a part of the population that the UK 
schooling system has let down. Towards the end of its term Labour also brought in plans 
                                                 
16 
For an account of the key policies introduced and the objectives lying behind them see CORRY, D. 2011a. 
Labour and the Economy, 1997–2010: More than a Faustian Pact, . In: DIAMOND, P. & KENNY, M. (eds.) 
Reassessing New Labour: Market, State and Society under Blair and Brown  
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(continued by the Coalition) to raise the education leaving age to 18. Similarly, the City 
Academies movement, focused under Labour on the most troubled schools in the most 
challenging areas, appears to have improved outcomes for pupils in deprived areas (Machin 
and Venoit, 2011).  
Although the proportions in education have improved, it is less clear-cut that quality has 
increased – especially relative to competitor countries. There has been a large increase in 
qualifications, even if there is a concern that some of this might reflect grade inflation rather 
than a real improvement (English PISA scores remain stubbornly low). Some elements of 
educational reform such as the Literacy and Numeracy Hour do appear to demonstrate 
positive improvements  (McNally, 2010). 
Research and development 
The UK introduced its first R&D tax credits in 2001 (for small firms) and 2003 (for large 
firms). There is good international evidence that R&D is a major source of productivity 
growth and also that such fiscal incentives are an effective way to increase research (e.g. Hall 
and Van Reenen (2000); Bloom et al, (2002a)). In addition, there were substantial increases 
in direct grants through the science budget.  
It is likely that these policies helped to stabilise the decline in R&D intensity which had been 
occurring in the UK since the late 1970s, in contrast to the increases in other nations. 
Although there have unfortunately been no direct evaluations of the UK R&D tax credit, US 
evidence does suggest that these fiscal incentives raise productivity and innovation (Bloom et 
al., 2002b). Haskel and Wallis (2010) show that there do seem to be substantial spillovers 
from spending on the Science Budget via research councils. 
Utilities regulation: A case study of telecom regulation 
The UK was a pioneer in privatising many state-owned monopolies. The first wave of this 
began under Mrs Thatcher after 1979 and continued in the decades thereafter. Mostly, this 
process has been a success in the sense that prices and quality have seen dramatic 
improvements (Green and Haskel, 2004). Furthermore, the financial and business service 
skills surrounding the privatisation and regulated sectors (e.g. utilities) has been a huge 
growth industry. As the privatisation model became copied overseas, these skills (e.g. 
consultancy) have added to Britain’s export revenues. 
A criticism of the privatisations was that in many cases, public sector monopolies were 
allowed to remain private sector monopolies who could exploit their market power. Labour 
was more aggressive in moving from regulation to effective competition fostering greater 
entry of newcomers into the business markets of the incumbents, but then allowing these 
incumbents more freedom to set prices and compete. 
To illustrate this we look at the example of telecom regulation. In 1981 Mercury was licensed 
to be the first competitor for the incumbent British Telecom (BT), which was privatised in 
1984.  At this stage the aim was for Mercury to build its own infrastructure to compete with 
BT, with limited access to BT’s network. RPI-X regulation was designed for BT in order to 
control its prices.  While more competitors were allowed to enter the market, the focus 
remained on infrastructure competition until 1997. At this point, access to BT’s network was 
at retail prices and cable TV operators began to build networks offering telecoms bundled 
together with TV channels. Competition became more service provider based after 1997 as 
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various measures were introduced by the regulator Oftel to enable new entrants to access 
BT’s network.  In 2000 BT was required to unbundle the local loop17  
However, until the early 2000s, significant barriers to entry remained. A key milestone was 
the 2003 Communications Act, which replaced Oftel with Ofcom and established a new 
regulatory framework.  Ofcom’s Telecommunications Strategic Review called for the 
restructuring of BT into four business units- specifically separating the network part of the 
business (Openreach) so that BT would offer access to its network on equal terms to 
competitors as it did to its own retail and wholesale services. Following the creation of 
Openreach in 2006, all of BT’s retail prices have been deregulated, together with some of 
BT’s wholesale products. The access and local loop prices charged by Openreach are 
controlled. 
Most commentators see the strengthening of competition in telecoms as a success story with 
lower prices, improved quality, high innovation and greater customer choice. Some of the 
changes were prompted by European Regulation, but Labour’s decision to create Ofcom and 
its strategic review were important in accelerating the liberalisation of the sector. The shares 
of new entrants and consumer welfare rose quickly after BT’s restructuring in the mid-2000s 
(Pollitt, 2009). 
3.3 Summary on Linking Post 1997 Performance to Post 1997 Policy 
Determining the causal effects of any policy is difficult, so the task of determining what part 
of aggregate productivity growth was explicitly due to any of Labour’s policies is a 
Herculean task. There was a relative productivity improvement post 1997 and we deem it 
unlikely that all of this occurred simply as a long lagged response to the Conservative 
reforms in the 1980s. These would unlikely have led to permanent improvements in 
productivity growth. 
We have pointed to several areas of policy which seemed to raise productivity – competition 
and regulation policy strengthened markets and human capital and innovation policies 
strengthened UK capacities. The nature of these policies was in many respects a continuation 
of past trends, deepening competition through more aggressive interventions. Their success is 
perhaps indicated that for the most part they have not been reversed. 
4. The Great Recession and Beyond 
4.1 Introduction 
In this section we focus on events since the beginning of 2008 to the current day - broadly 
with data through the second quarter of 2011. We call this the “Great Recession” period 
although one could say we are formally out of the recession as growth has been (just about) 
positive. 
The key question is whether the recession has put the economy on a lower long-term 
productivity growth path than pre-recession (i.e. broadly the 1979-2007 productivity growth 
rate)?  A second question is how much of the fall in potential output is permanent and how 
much is transitory? The answers to these questions determine the view one takes of the path 
of potential output, the output gap and therefore the “room” policy makers have for 
stimulating the economy through fiscal and monetary means. The pessimistic view is that the 
UK is currently near potential output, so there is little or even no space for demand to 
                                                 
17
 This enabled other operators to use the connection between customers’ premises and the local exchange to 
offer fixed telephony and broadband services. 
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increase real output without igniting further inflation. In other words, the “economic speed 
limit” has been lowered. A more optimistic reading would suggest a larger output gap and 
therefore a greater role for demand stimulus; or equivalently, less of a need for fiscal austerity. 
While a full analysis of the recession is outside the scope of this paper, we consider whether 
the structure of the economy which emerged under Labour caused the UK to enter the 
recession in a particularly vulnerable position, implying that our current output gap is small 
and future growth will be slower than that of the pre-crisis years. To address this we first ask 
why we focus on the Great Recession (sub-section 0) and what it reveals about Labour’s 
record (sub-section 0). Then we look at the productivity record (sub-section 0), which leads 
us into the debate around the output gap (sub-section 0). We discuss the reasons why the 
financial crisis and other factors may have dampened productivity permanently (sub-sections 
0 and 0) and critically review the evidence on this in (sub-section 0). 
4.2 Why Look at the Great Recession? 
To most readers, it would seem obvious to focus on the last few years because this is the 
obsession in policy and media circles. But from an academic perspective this period is by far 
and away the hardest to analyse because recent data, especially on output, is subject to large 
revisions. This is especially so during times of huge changes when GDP has fallen by more 
than at any time since the Great Depression and this makes judgements open to an unusually 
high degree of uncertainty. Industry-level data is not available at the level of detail that we 
used in Section 1. Looking at even broad industries from an international perspective is 
impossible as the data has not yet been constructed in a comparable way (although it will be 
in time). 
Despite these difficulties it is important to do some analysis. First, because of the widespread 
view that the economic problems of recent years reveal that the good 1997-2007 performance 
was an illusion. Second, because many commentators have taken strong views on what UK 
performance is likely to be going forward that we believe are based on false certainties. 
Finally, policy has to be based on our best guess of where we are, so we seek to inform this 
debate to the best of our ability, at least in order to clarify the differences in the arguments. 
4.3 What Does the Great Recession Reveal About Labour’s Policies? 
There are a number of stories that try to link the problems of the UK economy now to what 
happened in the Labour period. These tend to get mixed up and it is important to distinguish 
and analyse them separately. 
Were the 1997-2007 productivity improvements a statistical illusion? 
In pride of place is the argument that the productivity improvements from 1997-2007 were 
mainly froth, driven by a finance and real estate bubble. Thus when the crash happened the 
mask was removed and the UK was revealed to have a much lower trend rate of growth and 
productivity than had been previously maintained. Potential output was lower than we had 
thought and so despite a massive fall-off in output now compared to what it would have been 
if trend had been maintained, the UK has virtually no gap between potential and actual output. 
Our work in the previous chapters suggests this argument does not really stack up. As we 
have seen, the financial sector only contributed about 0.4% of the 2.8% annual growth in the 
UK market economy, which excludes the public sector and real estate, both of which held 
back aggregate productivity. We also saw that productivity increases were mainly based in 
business services and distribution and generated through the increased importance of human 
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capital and ICT (compared to low-tech capital). It is difficult to see why such activities could 
be solely generated by an artificial financial or property bubble. 
Was the Great Recession due to Labour’s policies? 
The second argument is that the crash itself was the result of Labour policies. One reason for 
this is the weak regulation of the financial sector which clearly had a role to play in causing 
the financial crisis. This “light touch” regulation was supported by the previous government, 
and was a global phenomenon with the catalyst being in the US and not the UK. So although 
the global financial liberalisation in the 1990s and 2000s was generally supported by Labour, 
it is likely that broadly the same policies would have been pursued by the Conservatives. It is 
hard to blame the global crash on the UK policies. 
Did Labour do the wrong things after the crash occurred? 
The third argument is that the wrong things were done once the crash occurred.  However, as 
our work shows, the record even through to 2010 was not that bad. If anything the vigorous 
counter-cyclical and interventionist actions that were taken, and which had real and 
confidence effects from 2008, meant that output and employment did not fall nearly as much 
as it could have. Recapitalising banks and maintaining demand through fiscal policies were 
common throughout the OECD and indicated that policy lessons had been learned from the 
Great Depression. 
Productivity fell, but primarily because employment stayed much higher than would be 
expected compared to previous recessions (Gregg and Wadsworth, 2011). Real wages have 
fallen substantially since the Great Recession, and this has been an important factor in 
keeping unemployment much lower than we would expect. Additionally, the effectiveness of 
the Employment Service is greater than in previous recessions. 
Did Labour’s policies leave the UK more vulnerable to the effects of the downturn than 
other countries?  
The strongest challenge is that the UK economy was particularly vulnerable to a downturn 
because of policy mistakes made by Labour. The primary mistakes are to do with financial 
regulation and public debt. 
Financial market regulation 
Financial market regulation clearly failed. The UK had pioneered the “light touch” rule of 
reason approach to guiding financial markets – before Labour came into power – and an 
approach that the new Financial Services Authority
18
 pursued. The direction of travel was 
similar to many other countries such as the US, but the UK was clearly a supporter or even a 
leader in some areas. Other nations such as Canada, were more prudent and this is one reason 
why they have weathered the financial storm much better. 
The light touch regulation helped the development of the financial services industry and there 
have been benefits of this in terms of access to credit. But it was clear this went too far 
(although nowhere nearly as bad as in the US sub-prime fiasco). The wholesale end of the 
finance sector concentrated in the City of London is the strongest cluster in the UK and 
created huge amounts of tax revenue and high paying jobs. It also drew a lot of talented 
people in the UK towards this sector and out of other industries that would be more 
                                                 
18
 The Financial Services Authority (FSA) is the UK financial regulator, an independent non-governmental body 
which was given statutory powers by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. 
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favourable to long-term growth. Because the UK has a larger financial sector than other 
countries it took a harder hit in the downturn. On the positive side, however, if there is a 
reallocation of British talent away from finance towards sectors that are creating more real 
and durable output, this could in the long-term be a boost to national income.   
Section 5 discusses some of the policy choices around finance going forward. In retrospect, a 
major problem was “too big to fail” – equity and bondholders of financial institutions were 
given too many implicit and explicit guarantees of protection if they got into trouble. This 
encouraged banks to take excessive risks and disguise these risks by creating exotic and 
opaque financial instruments. By being protected on the downside for the risks, but being 
handsomely rewarded on the upside, this created a form of structural moral hazard so that all 
agents from shareholders, to CEOs to traders were incentivised to take these risks.  When the 
crisis hit, the state had little choice but to bailout the failing institutions. But during the good 
times, and with hindsight, it is clear that regulatory policy should have been more vigilant in 
all countries in (a) creating a mechanism for the orderly break-up of failing banks (such as so-
called “living wills”); (b) demanding higher capital requirement to prevent the excessive 
leveraging of debt (a la Basel 3); (c) keeping a greater separation between the “casino” 
(investment) and “utility” (retail) part of banking; (d) controlling the exposure of utility 
banking to raising finance in the wholesale market (Northern Rock’s problem) and (e) paying 
more attention to asset bubbles (such as in housing). 
There is a huge debate over the causes of the financial crisis and we do not have space to go 
through all the arguments here  (for an excellent discussion of these issues see inter alia 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009); LSE Future of Finance (Turner et al., 2010); Rajan (2010); 
Squam Lake Report (Turner et al., 2010)). Labour’s policies towards the financial sector were 
remiss and a better approach to the financial sector would have reduced some of the costs in 
lost output. On the other hand, it is likely that Conservative policies would have been broadly 
similar. The failure of financial market regulation was really a global problem, whose 
consequences we will be living with for a long time to come. 
Public debt 
Financial deregulation also meant that consumers were able to borrow money easily and 
build up very large debts. In the light of the current Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, however, 
the greater concern has been with the level of public debt.  
In retrospect, it is clear that public debt levels were too high for the stage of the cycle in 2008 
in the UK (alongside many other countries like the US, Ireland and Spain). This reflected the 
large increase in public spending after 2000 with what we now can see were insufficient 
increases in tax to fully pay for this, which meant that the budget deficits were running up 
debt. The debt position has exacerbated the pain of recession. However, the “structural” 
element of the deficit, excluding investment spending, that was not related to cycle was only 
about 1% of GDP in 2008 (Portes, 2011). Over the next two years this jumped to 5% because 
of the crisis – the poor state of the public finances was a consequence of the recession, not a 
cause of it. 
Having said this, a sense of perspective is required the UK debt and deficit position is not 
catastrophic in an historical context. In 2010 national debt stood at 52% of GDP, high in 
comparison to the 1980s and  1990s (see OECD Economic Outlook Database, 2010)., but 
lower than much of the 20
th
 Century (between 1750 and 1850 debt exceeded 100% of GDP). 
Compared to other countries the maturity of UK sovereign debt is very long which means 
that the Chancellor does not have to raise finance frequently (like Italy). The UK is not 
Greece. According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) (see data in Table 10.2) between 1800 and 
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2008 Greece was in default or rescheduling public debt 50.6% of the time and the figure for 
Spain was 23.7%. Britain, by contrast was in such a state zero per cent of the time.  
As discussed below, Labour left office with a plan to eliminate the structural deficit in eight 
years. In July 2010, the Coalition replaced this with a plan to eliminate the structural deficit 
in four years. Thus there is and was a cross-party consensus over the medium term plan to 
reduce the deficit: the question is more to do with its pace and timing – perhaps a second 
order issue but a crucial one nevertheless.  
Summary 
The Great Recession does not overturn our assessment of real productivity improvements 
pre-2007 and certainly does not show that Labour was to blame for the recession. However, 
the failure to properly regulate finance and the failure to bring the deficit down by more 
during the good times were, in retrospective, clearly policy mistakes which left the country 
vulnerable to the downturn.  
4.4 UK Productivity Performance in the Great Recession 
We have seen, in sub-section 0 that productivity has suffered substantially since 2008, the 
onset of the Great Recession. As previously discussed, EU KLEMS data is not available 
beyond 2007, and therefore it is not possible to carry out the cross-country sectoral 
productivity analysis on the same basis. We therefore consider recent ONS data for the UK 
only in Figure 25 (GDP per job looks similar). While service sector productivity appears to 
have been more flat during the recession, GDP per hour in the production sectors saw a 
sharper dip on 2009, followed by some recovery and then decline since 2010. Understanding 
this shortfall in productivity is at the heart of the debate over the output gap: the difference 
between current level of output and the potential level of output.  
Figure 25: Output per hour worked, seasonally adjusted, Index=100 in 2008 
  
Notes: Analysis based on ONS Labour Productivity Statistical Bulletin, Q2 2011. Production consists of mining 
& quarrying, manufacturing and electricity, gas and water. The services sector comprises of distribution, hotels 
& restaurants, transport storage and communication and business services & finance.   
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4.5 The Output Gap and its Estimation 
What is the output gap? 
The output gap is defined as the difference between potential output and actual output. 
Potential output is not observed and must be estimated. It can be thought of as the amount of 
output consistent with stable inflation. Formally, potential output is defined as the highest 
possible level of output that can be achieved by the potential labour force (assuming some 
natural rate of unemployment) and the capital stock that can be employed, without 
inflationary pressures, and given the state of technology (Van Ark, 2010). It is important 
because an economy where the output gap is zero cannot stimulate demand without causing 
an inflationary spiral. 
The output gap is a crude concept, easy to think of in the manufacturing economy as “spare 
capacity” but increasingly irrelevant in a service driven economy as many service sectors 
activity can be scaled up very quickly should demand appear. Physical capital is much less 
important that human capital and business capabilities in the service sector and, as noted in 
Section 2, such forms of intangible capital are exceptionally hard to measure. 
Furthermore, potential output is also affected by demand. The degree of long term 
unemployment depresses potential output and the ability to expand, as long-term unemployed 
lose skills and motivation and cease to put downward pressure on wages. Long periods of 
deficient demand will build up structural unemployment and so cause “hysteresis” increasing 
the output gap. 
Figure 26 shows the latest available GDP figures from the ONS
19
, which increased its 
estimates of the pre-crisis trend growth rate up to 3.2% (based on GDP at market prices), and 
revised its view of the recession as being deeper than previously thought. The result is that 
output in Q2 2011 was around 14% lower than we may have expected without the crisis
20
. 
The dashed line in Figure 26 extrapolates the 1997Q1 to 2007Q4 average growth rates 
through to 2011Q2. 
                                                 
19
 The 2011Q3 figures released in early November from ONS are preliminary and do not have a fully restated 
time series in the same format as the Q2 quarterly bulletin. 
20
 This is higher than the 11% based on Bank of England’s May forecasts, GILES, C. 2011a. The 14 per cent 
question. Financial Times. 
44 
 
Figure 26: GDP at market prices (£ million) 
 
Notes: Analysis based on ONS Q2 2011 Quarterly National Accounts, downloaded 25
th
 October 2011, which 
runs through to Q2 2011. GDP in £ million, in real terms at market prices (chained volume measure (reference 
year 2008), seasonally adjusted, together with a trend line calculated based on the average annual growth rate 
between 1997 and the end of 2007. 
In stylised form, Figure 27 shows the nature of the different positions taken on the output gap 
which are more or less bounded between what we call the “extreme” optimists and pessimists. 
An extreme optimist would believe that the economy could continue to grow at a similar rate 
as prior to the recession and that there has not been a permanent reduction in the level of 
output so the output gap is very large. This is the upper dashed line in Figure 27. Pessimists 
believe that not only has the economy taken a permanent hit to the level of output it is now on 
a lower growth path (this is the lower dashed line in Figure 27). The current level of output is 
on or close to potential output in the supply side pessimists’ view.  
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Figure 27: Extreme optimists and pessimists’ views potential output and the output gap 
 
Notes: Analysis based on ONS Q2 2011 Quarterly National Accounts, downloaded 25
th
 October 2011, which 
runs through to Q2 2011. GDP in £ million in real terms at market prices, (chained volume measure, reference 
year 2008), seasonally adjusted. Stylised optimists’ view of potential output corresponds to the trend line based 
on the average annual growth rate between 1997 and the end of 2007. Stylised extreme pessimists’ view of 
potential output corresponds to a trend line based on the average quarterly growth rate between Q2 2009 and Q2 
2011.  
Most other views lie in between these two extremes (Figure 28)
21
. For instance one might 
have a belief that after a permanent drop-off in the level of output, the economy could have 
grown at its old prior rate (this is labelled an “In-between” view in (Figure 28). One could 
also believe that there has been some permanent fall in output (smaller than the fall shown in 
Figure 26), combined with a slightly lower trend growth rate.  Policy choices during the 
recession itself are highly likely to have also lowered the sustainable rate. 
 
                                                 
21
 Although of course there are ultra-pessimists who believe things may get even worse with a collapse of the 
Eurozone, further slowdown of the US and China, etc. Their projections would be even further south of the 
dotted line. 
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Figure 28: Most views of potential output, and hence the output gap lie somewhere in 
between 
 
Notes: Analysis based on ONS Q2 2011 Quarterly National Accounts, downloaded 25
th
 October 2011, which 
runs through to Q2 2011. GDP in £ million, in real terms at market prices (chained volume measure (reference 
year 2008), seasonally adjusted. Stylised in between view allows for a loss in productive potential following the 
crisis (the amount may vary), but the economy can return to pre-crisis trends. 
In general we would not expect the output gap to be merely the difference between current 
output and a simple extrapolation of a pre-crisis trend, particularly where major structural 
changes have occurred in the economy as a result of the crisis some of them a factor of 
demand itself. Thus the extreme optimist position is unlikely to be correct. Such changes may 
reduce the economy’s productive potential, for example via the scrapping of human and fixed 
capital, reduced innovation and lower workforce participation. On the other hand, bad times 
may be a period where lower productivity firms go under and when firms invest in 
technological and organizational innovation building up potential productive capacity when 
the upturn comes; indeed after a ‘typical’ recession we often see steep recoveries and high 
growth rates. Given all these uncertainties therefore, the output gap is typically estimated 
using some model as discussed in the next sub-section. 
The concept of the output gap is central to the Office for Budget Responsibility’s (OBR) 
economic and fiscal forecasts, and its assessment of whether the Government is on track in 
meetings its deficit reduction targets. As the output gap determines the extent that the 
economy can grow in a sustainable fashion, it tells us how much of the current deficit can be 
reduced as the economy recovers as opposed to needing to be dealt with through further 
austerity. 
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Estimating the output gap 
The key issue in measuring the output gap is that potential output is unobservable, and must 
be estimated. A number of approaches may be used in order to estimate potential output, each 
with its own advantages and limitations
22
: 
 Statistical filters: Statistical filters such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter can be used to 
extract a smoothed trend from an output series, approximating the path of potential 
output. Such methods have the advantage that they are transparent and easy to 
replicate, but they lack economic foundations and suffer from end point issues, 
particularly in the presence of a structural break (like the financial crisis)
23
. A lot will 
depend on over what period the smoothing is taken. As Figure 27 shows using 1997-
2007 would look like the optimists whereas using 2007-2011 would give something 
very pessimistic. 
 
 Production function approach: Estimates of potential output are derived from 
assumptions on the potential level of capital and labour, and TFP. This is the approach 
favoured by most of the institutions that publish output gap estimates
24
. The 
production approach has the advantage that it is based on a solid economic model, and 
the contributions of different factors to potential growth can be assessed. However, a 
number of judgements and measurement issues are involved in the estimation, these 
methods often involve statistical filters for obtaining their inputs, and this method is 
highly sensitive to revisions in national accounts. The key element in the production 
function will be the estimation of TFP growth: if this is deemed to be the same as the 
1979-2007 trends (about 1% pa in the market sector) then this will generate 
reasonably optimistic outcomes.  
 
 Cyclical Indicators: A wide range of indicators (including business surveys and other 
national statistics) are used to inform the estimate of the output gap. These indicators 
must be combined and weighted to produce an aggregate output gap estimate. This is 
the approach used by the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR), and two different 
methods are used for combining the information in the cyclical indicators (OBR, 
2011a): the “aggregate composites method” and “principal components analysis”. The 
series obtained from these alternative methods are standardised and then scaled to the 
historical OECD output gap series (using its mean and standard deviation). Since this 
is based on a production function approach the cyclical indicator method “piggy backs” 
off this other method, and therefore shares many of the same problems. It does have 
the advantage of using a wide range of indicators relevant for assessing the output gap, 
and is less sensitive to national accounts revisions. However, there are still huge 
measurement error issues, particularly in survey data (e.g. Bank of England Inflation 
Report (BoE, August 2011)  for discussion). It is extremely unclear that “recruitment 
difficulties” means the same thing over time, especially after a massive fall in output 
                                                 
22
 For a good high level evaluation of statistical filter versus production function approaches, see COTIS, J.-P., 
ELMESKOV, J. & MOUROUGANE, A. 2005. Estimates of potential output: Benefits and pitfalls from a policy 
perspective. In: REICHLIN, L. (ed.) The Euro Area Business Cycle: Stylised Facts and Measurement Issues. 
London: CEPR. Appendix 4 gives more detail on the methodologies used by OBR, OECD, IMF, NIESR and the 
EC. 
23
 We note that rather than standing on their own, such methods are often used within a production function 
framework (for series such as NAIRU, TFP or participation rates). 
24
 See the OECD, European Commission (EC), NIESR, and until recently, IMF. 
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and jobs. In addition this method is highly sensitive to the variance in the OECD 
historical forecasts. 
 
 Semi-structural approaches: These are mixed methods, relying on both structural 
econometric foundations and recent econometric techniques, such as unobservable 
components models
25
. The IMF has recently adopted this type of approach in its 
“Global Projection Model” (IMF, 2010), conditioning potential output on three 
variables (in addition to output itself): unemployment, capacity utilisation and 
inflation. In general, unobserved components models have the advantage of being 
based on economic foundations, however estimates tend to be very sensitive to 
econometric specification (e.g. EC Economic Policy Committee (2001)) and are 
subject to large margins of error (Orphanides and van Norden, 2002). 
Despite their apparent sophistication, these methods are little more than educated guesses, 
especially when the economy has been experiencing a major recession. There exists 
enormous uncertainty over the output gap level. Table 6 summarises the most recent 
published estimates of the UK output gap, together with the methodology used. While the 
OBR currently uses a cyclical indicators approach to produce its own estimates, it compares 
these with the estimates of other leading forecasters, and performs sensitivity analysis on 
central estimates
26
.  
Table 6: Recent published estimates of the UK output gap, expressed as a percentage of 
potential GDP 
 
Notes: Extension of the summary provided in the OBR Economic and Fiscal Outlook, Office of Budget 
Responsibility, March 2011 (OBR, 2011b). Output gap expressed as a percentage of potential GDP. MPC 
references are speeches given by Posen (2010) and Weale (2010). 
                                                 
25
 Statistical filter methods are nested within the group of unobserved components models (Orphanides and van 
Norden, 2002). 
26
 The OBR may soon change its methodology, GILES, C. 2011e. Spare capacity doubt clouds growth picture. 
Financial Times. 
Source Methodology Output gap Year
Trend GDP growth rate 
assumed
MPC, Adam Posen, 2010 Not specified 3-over 4% 2010 suggests that it is largely 
unchanged
MPC, Martin Weale, Nov 2010 Not specified 4-6.5% 2010 "trend growth has 
probably fallen a little"
European Commission, Autumn 
Forecast, 2010
Production function just over 5% 2010 n/a
IMF, World Economic Outlook, 
October, 2010
Semi-structural approach 2.6% 2010 n/a
NIESR, January Economic Review, 
January 2011
Production function 4% or more 2010 "not much greater than 
2%"
OECD, Economic Survey of the 
United Kingdom, March 2011
Production function 4.6% 2010 n/a
OBR, Economic and Fiscal Outlook, 
March 2011
Cyclical indicators 3% 2010 2.35% to end 2013, 2.10% 
after
IMF, World Economic Outlook, 
October, 2011
Semi-structural approach 2.9% 2011 n/a
Chris Giles, FT, September 2011 Cyclical indicators 2.6% 2011 n/a
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At the time of writing (November 2011) the most recent published estimates have been made 
by the FT (Giles, 2011f), using the OBR methodology but updating it for the three additional 
quarters of data which are now available (the March OBR estimates used data up to 2010 Q3). 
The estimate of spare capacity using the “aggregate composite” approach is 1.7% (down from 
the 3.9% it expected in the second quarter of 2011). On the second measure (“principal 
components”), the estimate of spare capacity is higher at 3.5%. When the OBR’s standard 
practice of averaging the results from the two techniques is used, the estimate of spare 
capacity is 2.6%. 
Overall, the consensus is that some spare capacity still exists in the economy, but the extent 
of this seems to range from 1.7% to over 6.5%. Given that there are also standard errors 
around these, such estimates would seem a poor guide to policy decision-making. 
More recent estimates of output gap appear to be getting smaller. This could be due to (i) 
revisions in the data; (ii) because the damage done by the recession was deeper than 
originally thought; (iii) much of the capacity before the recession was illusory; (iv) human 
and physical capital scrapping (i.e. loss of skills due to unemployment and less job related 
training – see Weale (2010) and Barrell and Kirby (2011)); or (v) lower investment. If (iv) 
and (v) are a response to insufficient demand then potential output will fall. It is not clear 
how low the output gap has to be to make demand expansion too risky. It is often implied that 
we are already there but in fact even the lowest estimates are still quite large. There is also a 
general lesson. Even if the real output gap was large (say 6% or more), if policy makers 
mistakenly believe it is small and keep demand low this will reduce potential output and 
make the output gap small. Thus pessimism becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
4.6 Supply Side Pessimism: the Financial Sector 
Why are banking crises so bad for output? 
A commonly held view is that lower productivity is due to a permanent and structural loss in 
productive capacity, and the economy will not return to pre-crisis trends (OBR, 2011b), 
(Giles, 2011d). In this case, the output gap is very small, and we will not return to the types 
of growth rates witnessed pre-crisis, but stay on a lower growth trajectory.  
The challenge for the pessimists is to explain why underlying productivity growth suffered so 
much and so quickly. One potential explanation that has been put forward is the contraction 
of banking (Giles, 2011d, HMT, 2010, OBR, 2010, Weale, 2009). Banking could damage 
productivity in at least two ways. Firstly, there is a mechanical reallocation effect whereby 
since banking is a high (measured) productivity sector, the shift of workers out of banking 
jobs and into lower productivity sectors will have a permanent negative impact on aggregate 
productivity. Giles (2011d) in fact accounts for 74% of the fall in the output with this effect. 
The calculations below, however, suggest that this is an over-estimate. 
A second way the financial sector may have more general effects on productivity are more 
indirect including: 
 Loss of productivity due to a less efficient allocation of capital (BoE, November 2009, 
Haugh et al., 2009, OBR, 2010). 
 Reduction in business investment in response to increase cost of finance, due to 
market risk aversion and banks’ capital needs (Barrell, 2011, Barrell and Kirby, 2011, 
BoE, February 2011, OBR, 2010). 
 Fewer new company formations and increased capital scrapping or liquidation of 
companies during the recession (BoE, February, May, August 2011) 
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 Diversion of managerial time to deal with financial relationships rather than 
productivity improvements (Dale, 2011,) 
 Small firms are disproportionately hurt and these small firms are disproportionately 
innovative (Dale, 2011)
27
  
Recessions caused by banking crises are believed to be more severe than general recessions 
for these reasons. There is some evidence that this is the case from macro-econometric 
analyses (Cerra and Sexana, (2008); Furceri and Mourougane (2009), IMF (Cerra et al., 
2009)). For example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) compile data from 800 years across many 
countries to show the damage done by financial booms and subsequent busts. But as they 
concede (p.165) “It is beyond the scope of this book to ascertain the longer-run growth 
consequences of banking crises.” 
One might wonder how convincing these arguments are, what scale of impact they could 
have and how long lasting they will be. For example, if we thought that the boom in finance 
in the 2000s led to severe distortions in the allocation of capital (financial and human) an 
unwinding of these positions could in the longer term increase output as resources are 
released to more productive uses.  
A dramatic example is the Great Depression who proximate cause was a banking crisis. In the 
US GNP levels appeared to fall by about 17-19%: the peak-to-trough decline in GNP was 27% 
so that real output did not return to its 1929 level until 1939. However, the long-run growth 
rate was largely unchanged (Perron (1989), Ben-David et al. (2003)). Further, during the 
Great Depression, policy makers made many mistakes including attempting to balance the 
budget and running high interest rates. These were compounded by policies that reduced 
competition in product markets through tariffs and government sponsored cartels. The hope is 
that in this respect at least “this time it’s different” as states responded aggressively to shore 
up the banking system, and stimulate the economy with expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policy. Thus, it is not inevitable that we repeat the errors of the inter-war period and suffer 
such a large loss in permanent output. 
So far it has been hard to explain all the loss in productivity through these arguments alone 
(Dale, 2011, Martin, 2011). We examine this evidence in detail next.  
Evidence on the direct role of banking to lower growth in the recession 
We first focus on the direct role of banking which is easier to assess. We have already seen in 
sub-section 0 that productivity growth in the period preceding the crisis was not 
predominantly explained by finance. What about during the crisis? 
Using unpublished industry-level ONS data, analysis by Martin (2011) rejects the view that 
the contraction of banking alone can explain the productivity shortfall. Table 7 reproduces 
some of this analysis, showing the sectoral average annual growth rates in productivity, 
measured in terms of gross value added (GVA) per job for the pre-crisis period (2001 to 2007) 
and the period since then (Q1 2008 to Q4 2010), together with an output gap measured as the 
difference between actual output and what it would have been had it followed the pre-crisis 
trend. It is clear that average productivity growth fell substantially in finance, by 5.1 
percentage points. But large falls were witnessed in most other sectors too, particularly 
agriculture, mining and utilities (which includes oil). Slightly smaller falls were seen in 
                                                 
27
 This is a highly contested claim. R&D and patents are concentrated in larger firms. Smaller firms tend to be 
less productive, worse managed and pay lower wages. Contrary to popular belief, smaller firms do not create on 
net more jobs than larger firms - but newer firms do. See  HALTIWANGER, J. C., JARMIN, R. S. & 
MIRANDA, J. 2011. Who Creates Jobs? Small vs. Large vs. Young. NBER Working Paper. 
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sectors that make up a larger share of the economy (and therefore make a larger contribution 
to the aggregate fall in productivity), including manufacturing, distribution and transport. In 
fact a smaller deceleration was seen in business services which is the largest of the market 
economy sectors (at 24%, the same as “government and other services”). 
Table 7: Productivity growth by sector, 2001-2010 and 2010 productivity gap 
 
Notes: Table sourced from Martin (2011) based on published and unpublished data from the ONS. Output is 
GVA at basic prices chained volume measure (ONS code ABMM); exact index equivalent (c.f. ONS series code 
CGCE). Martin infers annual average output, workers and productivity from the quarterly data: the ONS 
provides an index of whole economy workers (code TXEL) which the inferred series closely approximates.  
Rounding errors arise because of the use of indices published by ONS to 1decimal place.  The growth rates in 
the first two columns are annual CAGRs rates for Q4 2000 to Q4 2007 and Q4 2007 and Q4 2010 respectively. 
The productivity gaps are calculated as the difference between outturn productivity and an extrapolated level, 
based the quarterly CAGRs using the Q4 2000 to Q4 2007 period. For further details see Martin (2011). 
Martin goes on to attribute the national productivity shortfall (national GVA per job 
compared to pre-recession trend) to each sector, distinguishing between a direct impact (the 
sector’s productivity shortfall weighted by its share in total trend output) and an indirect 
effect which comes from the shift of workers in or out of that sector (this latter effect is larger 
for sectors with above average trend levels of productivity). He finds that of the total 
productivity gap of 6.8%, only 0.8% is explained by shifts in employment- with the loss of 
jobs in finance and business services contributing to this, though for different reasons. The 
impact of business services has its root in the fact that previously the sector had rapidly 
expanding employment, whereas the impact of finance is due to it being a high productivity 
sector in which employment had not previously grown.  
In its August 2011 Inflation report, the Bank of England agrees that changes in employment 
shares from high productivity sectors (such as banking) to low productivity sectors can only 
explain a small proportion of the productivity gap, and that productivity weakness itself is 
spread across a range of sectors. Therefore, the most recent analyses suggest that the 
productivity gap cannot easily be explained by structural changes in the economy with jobs 
moving permanently from high productivity to low productivity sectors. 
2001-2007 2008-2010
Output per worker 1.7 -0.9 -2.6 -6.7
Output per job 1.7 -0.9 -2.6 -6.8
Of which
Agriculture, mining and utilities -2.2 -10.1 -7.9 -21.4 4%
Manufacturing 4.3 0.4 -3.9 -10.4 12%
Construction 1.1 0.9 -0.2 -3.0 6%
Distribution, hotels and catering 3.0 -0.7 -3.7 -8.5 16%
Transport and communications 2.4 -0.9 -3.3 -8.4 7%
Government and other services 0.0 -1.2 -1.2 -3.4 24%
Business services and finance 2.0 0.0 -2.0 -4.3 32%
  Of which
  Business services 1.2 0.0 -1.2 -1.8 24%
  Business services "proper" 2.3 -0.6 -2.9 -6.3 17%
  Financial intermediation 5.4 0.3 -5.1 -13.3 8%
   Of which
   Banking 7.7 2.5 -5.2 12.9 5%
Annual average growth, % Sector share 
of economy
Difference, 
%
Productivity 
gap, %
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4.7 Supply Side Pessimism: Other Evidence 
Even if the direct effect of the financial sector cannot account for the pessimists’ views of a 
large fall in potential output, the theoretical indirect effects of the banking crisis could have a 
more widespread effect. To complement the evidence that the banking crisis has caused 
major supply side damage, pessimists would point to several other pieces of evidence on 
growth, oil, inflation, jobs, trade and surveys of capacity utilisation. We discuss these in turn. 
Growth 
It is correct that past growth is not a guarantee of future growth, so we cannot simply assume 
that the productivity experience of 1979-2007 will continue in the future, and of course it is 
wise to take recent history into account. Thus pessimists give more weight in their projections 
of potential output to the last few years (recall Figures 2.7 and 2.8). The fact that other OECD 
countries have also taken a growth hit demonstrates that there are common effects at play. 
Nevertheless, it is hard to be sure that such common growth problems are a symptom of a 
common supply shock, rather than a common problem of a deep recession compounded by 
too little aggregate demand. And as discussed above, the theoretical arguments are not 
dispositive over what has happened to potential output. Our reading of growth theory is that 
long-run growth is unlikely to be affected as this is determined by fundamentals such as 
human capital, institutions, the innovation system and the rule of law. There is likely to be 
some fall in the level of potential output, but the magnitude is unclear and policy-dependent.  
The Decline of North Sea Oil 
In addition to finance, the high value added oil sector is in decline as North Sea Oil runs out. 
This has been a long run trend, however as the rate of productivity growth has slowed since 
the mid-1990s, and gone into decline since 2003 (see Dale, 2011). In our analysis oil is 
included within the “other goods producing industries”, in the sub-sector “mining and 
quarrying”. The sector overall contributed 0.6 p.p. to productivity growth between 1979 and 
1997 but only 0.1 p.p. in 1997-2007
28
. Thus it is not one of the high productivity growth 
sectors in the Labour period and so it is unlikely to have a material effect on the overall 
productivity position. 
Inflation 
For pessimists high recent inflation has been an indicator that the economy is near full 
capacity. However, the key indicator of being near full capacity is domestic wage inflation. 
This has been extraordinarily subdued during the current recession. Real wages have fallen 
significantly which is something which was not witnessed in the 1980s and 1990s recession. 
Real wages have also been much more subdued than in other countries which were also 
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 Dale (2011) considers that the productivity gap is 9% based on extrapolating a pre-crisis trend from Q1 1987 
to Q1 2008, and comparing to actual productivity. He then re-estimates the scale of the productivity shortfall 
using more plausible estimates for trend productivity in both the financial services and energy extraction sectors, 
obtaining a reduction of 2pp. The majority of this 2pp difference is due to slower underlying productivity 
growth in the energy extraction sector. In his analysis, the pre-crisis period includes the late 1980s to mid-1990s 
when productivity in energy extraction was increasing rapidly (see Chart 4, Dale (2011)). Our analysis in 
Section 1 looks at the 1997-2007 period, and therefore excludes the 1987-1995 period of rapid productivity 
growth. Therefore, our average annual productivity growth rate of 2.8% does not rely on a rapidly growing oil 
sector. In fact that average rate of productivity growth of “mining and quarrying” (which includes energy 
extraction), was negative at -2.9% per annum over 1997-2007. The average share of market economy GVA of 
this sector was 3% during this period. Mining and quarrying is within “other goods producing industries 
together with “electricity, gas and water supply”, “construction” and “agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing” 
– all sectors which saw average productivity increases over the period 1997-2007. 
53 
 
severely affected by the recession such as Spain. Low wages reflect the increased flexibility 
of the labour market in the UK compared to previous recessions, partly reflecting changes in 
union membership. For example, in 2010 only 24% of workers were in trade unions 
compared to over half in the early 1980s recession. In the private sector the proportion is only 
14%
29
. This wage flexibility is probably the major reason why employment rates have 
remained high in the UK despite the 7% fall in output, which was far greater than all other 
recessions since the World War II. An additional reason for lower than expected 
unemployment is a better functioning Employment Service which attempts to keep job 
seekers attached to the labour market rather than shifting them into other benefits or not 
enforcing work search. 
Inflation has been mainly driven by escalating import prices associated with the fall of the 
exchange rate, an increase in VAT and rising high commodity prices. Overall, domestic 
sources of inflation – wages and profits per unit of output have remained subdued (BoE, 
August 2011). 
Employment 
As a matter of arithmetic the fall in labour productivity is because output has fallen while 
employment has held up in the UK. In the US labour productivity looks good because 
employment has dropped by a lot more. 
Private sector employment rose in 2010 and 2011 and this is interpreted by pessimists as a 
further sign that there really has been a large negative supply shock. If firms were labour 
hoarding during the temporary downturn in demand then they would have responded by 
expanding output rather than hiring. Thus, more hiring is taken as a sign that productivity is 
genuinely lower and spare capacity is limited. 
There is a different interpretation of the events however. First, the rise in private sector 
employment was hardly spectacular. After falling by 4.2% in 2008-2009, it rose by 1.5% in 
2009-2010 and by only 1.1% in 2011-2010
30
. Second, there was some expectation of coming 
out of the recession, especially with government stimulus in the UK and overseas. Third, as 
already noted wages are also low, encouraging job creation. So firms may have hired with the 
hope of continued better demand out-turns. Subsequently, demand has been lower than 
expected as fiscal consolidation bites and the global outlook darkens. Again, it is unclear that 
better than expected job outcomes should be interpreted as firms’ response to a big permanent 
fall in productivity. 
Additionally, it is very relevant to the current outlook what view is taken of equilibrium 
unemployment (NAIRU). Even though current unemployment rates are lower than we might 
expect from earlier recessions, they are still high by historical standards at around 8%. Most 
estimates of the NAIRU are still around 5-6% which suggested considerable room for 
demand expansion without igniting inflation. 
Surveys of Capacity Utilisation 
If some sectors were operating above their normal level of capacity prior to the downturn 
then this could account for some of the productivity fall. Dale (2011) reckons this could 
account for 1 percentage point. But since the trends noted above were over the whole 1997-
2007 period, there would have to be above average capacity utilisation over the period taken 
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 www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/employment-matters/docs/t/11-p77-trade-union-membership-2010.pdf 
30
 ONS Labour Market Statistics database 12
th
 October 2011. 
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as a whole. Furthermore, the responses to these surveys are hard to interpret as discussed in 
sub-section 0.  
Trade 
Giles (2011b)emphasises that the UK’s trade performance has been unexpectedly bad in a 
way that is consistent with a larger permanent fall in productivity. Despite a 20% fall in the 
value of sterling over the past 4 years, there has been little import substitution and only a 
similar level of exports to pre-crisis. The UK has done no better than Spain, for example, 
which is (currently) still in the Eurozone. 
It is certainly true that these trade figures are disappointing, but it is unclear how much we 
can conclude from them in terms of productivity issues. Amongst possible explanations, there 
is a well-known J-curve effect in trade whereby a depreciation in the exchange rate can take 
several years before having an effect on trade (Carlin et al., 2001). At first, a depreciation 
may actually worsen exports, for example, as quantities take time to adjust and prices change. 
So the value of exports usually falls (all else equal) immediately after a depreciation, even if 
the quantity of exports do not. Eventually these should adjust too, though, so the UK’s poor 
trade performance remains somewhat of a puzzle.  
Summary on evidence over supply side pessimism 
The supply side pessimists have arguments that are cogent and cannot be dismissed. But the 
evidence of a large and permanent fall in potential output (and trend productivity growth) can 
all be contested. Certainly, the data on the financial and oil, growth, inflation, jobs and 
surveys does not seem compelling. The trade data is perhaps the biggest concern. 
4.8 A More Optimistic View 
One bit of optimism is that the GDP numbers may well be understated. Dale (2011), for 
example, notes that the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) believes that actual productivity 
is about 1.8 percentage points higher than the current numbers suggest.  
Even with this adjustment, a sizeable gap remains in current productivity from pre-crisis 
levels. The pessimistic view is that this is mainly a negative supply shock. The alternative 
view is that weak demand is constraining economic activity. Real wages have fallen, 
containing the rise in unemployment and leaving overall profitability at an acceptable level. 
Inflationary pressures have come from world commodity and factor prices. Under this view, 
there has been, at least until recently, large-scale labour hoarding combined with a fall in 
average hours worked implying the existence of spare labour resource ready to meet a 
recovery in demand. Pre-crisis trends in productivity can be resumed as the economy has not 
suffered much permanent damage to its supply potential. 
Of course a prolonged period of weak demand can itself lead to supply-side damage (through 
a loss or lack of investment in skills, or destruction of capital) and therefore a vicious cycle. 
Labour market factors may also be important here, including the growth in unemployment – 
especially youth unemployment and long term unemployment. As mentioned above, there 
may be a loss of skills; less job related training and so on. These hysteresis factors can 
prolong the consequences of the downturn. This fact has prompted debate into whether the 
austerity package, based on the “supply side” view, may actually become self-fulfilling even 
if the “demand side” view is closer to the truth (Wolf, 2011). We discuss austerity under the 
rubric of short to medium term growth strategies in the final section. 
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4.9 Summary on Output Gaps and Productivity 
There is huge uncertainty over whether the more pessimistic or optimistic view of the 
economy is closer to the truth. Pessimists see the current level of output as near full capacity 
whereas optimists believe there is a substantial output gap and room for demand expansion 
without sparking more inflation. Most commentators take a position between these two 
extremes seeing that there is some permanent loss of output and (perhaps) a permanent fall in 
the trend rate of growth. The difference between the realistic optimists and pessimists is how 
large or small these changes are, and this leaves room for reasonable people to disagree. 
In our view, it is likely that some capacity has been destroyed, while at the same time a lack 
of demand is depressing productivity, but the precise size of the output gap is uncertain. 
Based upon our analysis it does not appear that the recession is simply a bursting of the 
financial bubble with no hope of returning to pre-recession growth trends. Consequently, we 
would tend towards the more optimistic view of the UK economy. 
We now turn to the issue of what policies for growth should be pursued in the light of our 
analysis in the short to medium run and in the longer run. 
5. Policies for Long-Term Growth 
5.1 Introduction 
Our report has analysed the UK’s recent experience of growth. The period since 1997 has 
been better than is commonly thought as much has been coloured by the Great Recession. In 
our view the Labour years 1997-2010 were a successful period in terms of GDP per capita 
and productivity growth with a continuation of the good rate of productivity growth from 
1979. The last 30 years marked a sharp break in the relative decline of the UK compared to 
other advanced nations since the late Nineteenth Century, a decline that was flattered for the 
most part by the benign economic conditions in the Post-war recovery (see Table A5). 
We end with some thoughts on what this means for growth policies. Promoting long term 
growth is about how we expand the potential of the economy, whereas recovering from 
recession is about how we ensure that the economy runs at its current potential. At present we 
need policies for both
31
. 
Building on our analysis in the earlier parts of the report we look first briefly at growth 
policies in the short-run. Turning to the long-run, we examine principles, practices and 
particulars for growth policy. This is meant to stimulate further thought and lay out an 
agenda rather than providing definitive answers. 
5.2 Growth Policies in the Short and Medium Run 
The view that one takes of the UK’s productivity performance is an important (although by 
no means the only) influence in how to regard the policy stance over the next 4-5 years. 
Many of factors that will determine UK growth and productivity are outside the direct 
influence of economic policy – the Eurozone crisis, the development of the Arab Spring 
(which has influenced oil prices), US policy stalemate over public debt and the sustainability 
of growth in India and China will be more important than the exact macro-economic position 
of the UK. Nevertheless, UK policy still matter to some degree. 
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  Some of this is based on work done by Dan Corry and colleagues for a report for Centreforum, see 
BEATSON, M., CORRY, D., LEUNIG, T., NICHOLSON, C. & PRYCE, V. 2011. Growth Matters: Why the 
Budget must be for the long term. CentreForum, FTI Consulting. 
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The urgent question facing the government is the fiscal stance and whether to continue with 
“Plan A”. This is to eliminate the structural deficit within five years. The planned fiscal 
consolidation announced in the July 2010 Emergency Budget was based upon this strategy 
was a mixture of tax rises and spending cuts amounting to 7% of GDP by 2014/15.. Various 
alternative “Plan Bs” have been put forward which have a slower degree of fiscal 
consolidation. Labour’s March 2010 Budget suggested a consolidation of 5% of GDP by 
2016/17, for example, with further consolidation afterwards to eliminate the structural deficit. 
There have been many calls to slow down the rate of fiscal consolidation for example by 
temporarily reversing the increase in VAT taxes, reducing employers’ National Insurance 
(especially for the young), or slowing the cuts to public spending. 
Much has happened since the July 2010 Budget. In particular, UK growth has been more 
anaemic than expected. Whether the austerity programme was a partial cause of this 
slowdown is fiercely debated: growth started slowing down before the major cuts in public 
spending started to bite, but public sector job cuts are now much larger and expectations of 
spending cuts could also have a depressing effect on demand.  Regardless of the causal 
influence of austerity, the policy response to the slowdown of growth depends crucially on 
whether one regards this as driven by fundamental supply side weaknesses or demand side 
problems. If one believes that slow growth is driven by a weaker supply side due to low 
productivity, then attempts to stimulate demand through monetary policy or by slowing down 
the fiscal austerity program will be ineffective because this will merely stoke up inflation. In 
this “pessimistic” scenario, there is a case for actually accelerating the austerity program in 
order to meet the Chancellor’s fiscal plans.  
If one believes that the slowed growth is primarily a demand phenomenon and that the output 
gap is much greater than zero (see the previous section) then this leaves a greater role for a 
“Plan B”. Overall, our analysis suggests that the output gap may be larger than many 
pessimistic commentators assume because of (i) the strong productivity performance leading 
up to the Great Recession and (ii) the fact that this performance was not driven primarily by 
finance, property or oil.  
To Plan B or not to Plan B? That is the question 
Believing that there is a large output gap does not automatically imply that the government 
must depart from its Plan A for fiscal consolidation. There are at least three reasons for this: 
the monetary policy alternative, the efficacy of fiscal policy and the issue of (bond market) 
confidence. 
First, there is the question of whether monetary policy can deliver the necessary boost in 
demand. In normal times, monetary policy is the natural tool to reach for – it is much easier 
to fine-tune than fiscal policy and less likely to be wasted by politicians in “vanity projects”. 
These are not normal times, however. The UK monetary authorities (and the Federal Reserve 
and the ECB) are keeping interest rates low. There are rounds of quantitative easing, but there 
are strong limitations over what monetary policy can achieve when the interest rate is close to 
zero as it currently is. Fiscal policy becomes more attractive in these periods, especially those 
that can be more easily reversed such as temporary cuts to VAT and/or employer NI 
contributions (as recommended by our colleague Nobel Laureate Chris Pissarides
32
) or 
reversing some of the planned cuts in building investments (e.g. on schools, road and rail). 
These are not permanent increases in the public sector headcount or wages which are harder 
to reverse. 
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Second, there is the issue of whether domestic fiscal policy actually works at all. Our CEP 
colleague, Ethan Ilzetzki
33
 has produced the best evidence on fiscal multipliers and (like the 
IMF) rejected the more extreme claims that the multiplier is zero and that austerity can boost 
demand through expectations of smaller future public debts. He does find, however, that 
consistent with the Mundell-Fleming model fiscal policy is less effective in countries like the 
UK with floating exchange rates. However, there are sizeable standard errors around his 
estimates and they do not distinguish between spending during a deep recession, when fiscal 
policy is likely to be effective, and more normal times. 
Third, there is the vexed question of “confidence” in the bond markets. The Coalition 
government’s main argument given for frontloading the fiscal consolidation was to restore 
confidence in the financial markets over the credibility of the deficit reduction plan. The 
concern was that UK debt levels were unsustainable and that government borrowing costs 
would rise (as they have done for Greece, Portugal. Spain and Italy) in the absence of such a 
Plan A.  This is a question of market psychology and there are at least two parts to the 
confidence question. The first issue is whether in 2010 frontloading the fiscal consolidation 
(compared to Labour’s plans) meant that borrowing costs fell significantly? Recall that the 
March 2010 budget of Alistair Darling had already proposed a tough plan to reduce the 
deficit.  We argued in the previous section that although it was Labour’s policy mistake not to 
have reduced the deficit in the pre-crisis period by more, debt and deficit levels were not very 
high and even today’s levels in historical perspective are quite manageable. It is certainly true 
that borrowing costs for the UK at the time of the election were low and have remained low 
despite market turmoil. But is that because of confidence in the government’s fiscal hair shirt 
or the markets’ belief that the economy is going to be stuck at a very low growth rate and so 
the MPC will keep interest rates low? The evidence seems more consistent with the latter 
interpretation
34
.  
The second part of the confidence question is whether the Chancellor is right to stick to Plan 
A because to depart from it would radically undermine his credibility. In other words, even if 
the original Plan A was a mistake relative to Labour’s previous fiscal strategy, it is better to 
stick with it to avoid scaring the markets. It is hard to believe that the markets would punish a 
slowing down of fiscal consolidation in light of worse economic news, especially if the Plan 
B was based around sensible capital investment projects or temporary tax cuts.  
Summary on short-term plan for growth 
One view is that given slower growth (due to a supply side shock) we need to further tighten 
austerity to meet the government’s target to eliminate the structural deficit. We would argue 
against a further tightening of austerity and tend to side with those who are calling for a “Plan 
B” which actually slows down the current rate of deficit reduction. The attempt to meet this 
target is likely to cause economic harm and reduce long-term potential output. 
Space limitations mean that we do not enter a more detailed debate here on the exact changes 
to the fiscal stance a Plan B would involve, e.g. the mix between temporary VAT cuts, 
payroll tax reductions, slowdowns in the cuts of public investment in schools, roads and other 
capital projects
35
. The plan to have a medium credible deficit reduction needs to be combined 
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 One test (Portes, 2011) is to look at the correlation between changes in 10 year gilt yields and measures of 
confidence in UK growth such as the stock market and exchange rate. The evidence here is the opposite of the 
government’s argument. The correlation between these three indicators is strongly positive since May 2010. In 
other words, borrowing costs fall when the stock market falls and when sterling falls. Falling borrowing costs 
are an indication of lack of confidence in UK economic growth rather than an endorsement of fiscal prudence. 
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 For more discussion see PORTES, J. 2011. The Coalition's Confidence Trick. The New Statesman. 
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with sensible shorter run policies to avoid an (unintended) co-ordinated bout of international 
austerity.  
Whatever the short and medium-run responses to the current crisis are, we need a longer-run 
strategy for growth in order to restore fiscal and economic health. We now turn to this. 
5.3 Long-Run Growth Policies: Principles 
We will go into some policy details below, but it is useful to begin with five broad principles 
for long-run growth. First, we have learned some things from academic research into growth. 
Modern growth theory stresses the fundamental importance of innovation and human capital. 
Recent developments have shown that aggregate productivity is driven as much by the 
reallocation of activity towards the more productive firms and away from the less efficient 
(creative destruction) as improvements within long-lived firms. Competition is vital to both 
innovation within firms and the Darwinian process of natural selection between firms.  
Research also shows us something about the importance of agglomeration and of incentives 
and governance at sub-national levels – all of which points to the importance of cities and 
city-regions as centre of growth and productivity. Other work – and comparisons across 
countries - suggests one needs a combination of patient capital and good corporate 
governance, alongside things like venture capital, to encourage investment and innovation.  
Second, we have also learned something from the experience of the UK economy in Sections 
1 and 2Error! Reference source not found. and this in part supports some of the academic 
analysis in the growth literature. As discussed in Section 3, the improved UK productivity 
performance since 1979 that continued after 1997 was built upon improvements in product 
market competition, the accumulation of human capital, balanced regulation (although with a 
major failure on finance), and innovation policies.  
Third, there is a difference between policies that improve the labour market and those that 
improve productivity. While both are to be welcomed, this report has been focused less on 
jobs growth and more on how more output can be obtained from these jobs (i.e. productivity).  
Although at the firm level, boosts to productivity will generally increase sales and therefore 
employment growth, policies that improve productivity at the macro level do not necessarily 
mean more employment (although to the extent real wages increase this may draw more 
people into the labour market and out of welfare). Similarly, it is an error to believe that since 
measured productivity will often fall when we bring less skilled workers into the workforce, 
there is a trade-off between productivity and jobs. Potential output is improved by expanding 
the effective labour force and there is no reason to expect overall efficiency (TFP) to fall as 
the job market expands. 
Fourth, everyone should confess their ignorance on growth. There is no single “magic bullet” 
to growth and there is a desperate need to draw together the best international evidence and 
brainpower to analyse the experience of growth and what policies can influence it. It is a 
scandal that there are still so few rigorous quantitative evaluations of productivity (and other) 
policies and there remains poor funding to look into what works. The growth of Growth 
Commissions is to be welcomed in this respect, if these promote the sifting of the evidence 
and the stimulation of better thinking. The acceptance of fallibility in our knowledge places a 
premium on experimentation, evaluation and learning in policies – not the assumption that 
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the expert knows what to do and the government machine needs merely to have its lever 
pulled to deliver
36
. 
The development of sensible growth policies based on sound analysis is necessary but not 
sufficient for success. These policies have to be adopted by governments and effectively 
implemented. The current machinery of economic decision making and implementation in the 
UK does not seem fit for purpose (Corry, 2011b). Alongside the analysis of how to improve 
growth policies is a need to understand how best to deliver them. 
Finally, we have to move beyond the “laundry list” approach to growth policies. Prioritising 
key areas is the right approach, but bullet points of piecemeal reforms (which we will of 
course do below!) are insufficient. There has to be greater awareness of the complementarity 
between growth policies, prioritisation of where to focus efforts and a strategy to deliver this. 
Elsewhere we have described this “Plan V” for growth (Valero and Van Reenen, 2011), 
where the “V” is for a V-shaped recovery as opposed to the double dip recession that we may 
be heading into. 
5.4 Long-Run Growth Policies: Practices  
The most important aspect of a productivity growth strategy is to get the general structural 
conditions right. This involves some basic pre-requisites such as low corruption, a reasonable 
level of trust, effective rule of law, democracy, open labour and product markets and so on. 
Most OECD countries like the UK possess these assets. For a country like Britain, the 
environmental conditions for growth include sensible regulation (especially over competition 
policy and planning), a good human and physical capital infrastructure, a stable and 
transparent tax system, effective spatial governance system and a properly regulated financial 
system. The next sub-section discusses some of these in detail.  
An important issue is whether we can go beyond prescriptions for growth that simply focus 
on the broad economic environment and consider more specific and pro-active interventions. 
Economists have been rightly wary of a more interventionist stance because it smacks of 
discredited “industrial policy” and “picking winners”. Despite this most governments do have 
a de facto industrial policies (e.g. towards exports and FDI), so some advice on the best way 
to do it is useful. And recent work does suggest some role in principle for industrial policies 
(Aghion et al., 2011). 
What would a more pro-active growth strategy look like? In our view an effective long-run 
growth policy requires governments and civil society to consider two key factors. First, 
where are the likely areas of growth? Second, where does the UK have some comparative 
advantage? This comparative advantage might be revealed in current patterns of export 
activity or it could be latent and this harder to discover without experimentation. The latter 
may be important when there are some public goods which hold the sector back from 
developing such as skills or local public infrastructure. The intersection between the areas of 
global growth and comparative advantage is where policy makers should focus. Are there 
barriers stifling the potential growth of these industries in the form of laws, regulations and 
policies that could be removed? Are there some pro-active policies that could foster the 
development of such sectors? The government is inevitably involved in one way or another as 
procurer, regulator, and investor across many fields and in many sectors so that sensible, 
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considered use of its leverage can be used to help key sectors (without creating competitive 
distortions)
37
.  
This type of analysis can be done at a local level as well as a national one. It should involve 
key players – not just policy makers, but also business people. It is more a way of thinking 
than a particular prescriptive set of policies (Rodrik, 2007). 
It is easy to offer examples of such a Plan V. Guessing future growth sectors may seem like a 
fool’s errand but we do have some ideas of where these are – for example, healthcare, 
education, green technologies, business services and digital businesses. Similarly the UK has 
clear comparative advantages in areas such as bio-pharmaceuticals, financial and business 
services, creative industries and some areas of ICT (e.g. ARM). So the task is not hopeless – 
it is hard to be precise, but there are examples, such as higher education. 
Higher Education is a sector where the UK has some comparative advantage with globally 
recognised universities that attract the second largest proportion of overseas students in the 
world. In order to create a better higher education market, the increase in the fees cap and the 
reduction in direct subsidy are the right direction of travel, even though the speed and 
uncertainty are creating severe problems. More damaging, however, is the decision to cap net 
immigration at 100,000 per year, as well as the cut in “tier 1” visas for the exceptionally 
talented and the threat to the Post Study Work Visa. This is economic suicide, and the 
government should be doing the exact opposite – making it much easier for the very talented 
to come to the UK to work and study. This will boost a major sector, increase innovation and 
productivity and may even help curtail inequality by providing more competition for the 
highly educated. 
More generally education and health are likely to be growth sectors all over the world in the 
next few decades
38
. Ensuring that the UK exploits its many advantages in these sectors is 
important for prosperity and jobs.  
5.5 Long-Run Growth Policies: Particulars  
Having eschewed the laundry list approach, we will still look at some key particular policies 
that are important for long-term growth. 
Public sector productivity 
One area where the state has a very direct role is in public sector productivity. This remains 
an issue – not only in the UK but across the developed world. Public services of health, 
schooling and policing are what economists describe as “superior” goods – the share of 
family budgets devoted to these public goods increases as the family becomes richer (unlike 
say, food). And this is also true of societies - the share of national income devoted to these 
services (especially healthcare) seems to inexorably rise over time and, since they are mostly 
tax payer-funded, this is a great challenge in a time of austerity. 
Public sector productivity in the UK has been flat or declining since 1997. It is hard to 
measure of course, but even when one makes extensive adjustments for measurement 
problems (see the 2005 Atkinson Review for example), public sector productivity growth 
lags hugely behind that of the private sector. 
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So how can public sector productivity improve? In the second term of Tony Blair, there was 
an extensive attempt to inject greater competition into the public sector, in order to improve 
choice and increase diversity. This went alongside a substantial increase in public 
expenditure after 1999. 
In healthcare, there is a growing body of research that suggests that these quasi-market 
reforms started to improve healthcare after the mid-2000s. The combination of greater 
autonomy (e.g. Foundation Trusts), money following the patient (e.g. “Payment by Results”), 
and greater patient choice with information (e.g. “Choose and Book”) gave sharper incentives 
to hospitals to attract patients through improving quality (Bloom et al., 2010, Cooper et al., 
2010, Gaynor et al., 2010). Three recent econometric studies have all found that this 
competition significantly raised clinical quality and efficiency (Cooper et al., 2011). And 
furthermore, this improvement was especially strong for low-income patients.  
Of course, one needs to be very careful that in markets where there are so many asymmetric 
information and other market failure issues, such moves do not in fact have the opposite 
effects and simply push up costs – especially where the private sector is involved. Much 
depends on the particular circumstance and the way that quasi markets are implemented and 
regulated. For example, the decision to remove price competition from the current Health Bill 
was correct as otherwise competition could reduce clinical quality as it did in the Internal 
Market Period (Propper et al., 2008). 
A second way to improve public sector performance is to allow more geographical variation 
in public sector pay, which would involve moving away from national public sector pay 
bargaining. Propper and Van Reenen (2010) found that the heavily regulated national pay 
systems in the UK health system have been causing large numbers of unnecessary patient 
deaths, especially in London and the South-East. Allowing public sector pay to reflect local 
conditions would rebalance public services geographically and save more lives. A further 
advantage of greater public sector wage flexibility is that the high level of public sector pay 
makes it difficult for the private sector to attract skilled labour and so acts as a potential brake 
on business activity. On the other hand, such changes should not be used as a mechanism to 
make depressed regions compete simply on low wages. That cannot help us in many tradable 
areas where countries compete on wages way below the UK minimum wage, and where, due 
to their poor economic state, there is little demand for lower pay, non- tradable, service sector 
jobs (Beatson et al., 2011). 
The lesson appears to be that intelligent policies to improve product market competition and 
enhance labour market flexibility are ways of improving productivity in the public sector, just 
as they have done in the private sector.  
Financial markets 
The Great Recession was preceded by the worst financial crisis since the Second World War. 
There were multiple causes of the financial crisis (Garicano, 2010, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, 
Turner et al., 2010), but poor regulation was undoubtedly one factor and the first critical issue 
is how to improve regulation to mitigate the risks of future crises. While corporate 
governance is vital overall, despite some reform, it is still weak in the UK. Furthermore, we 
are sceptical of the view that poor corporate governance was the main cause of the financial 
crisis as there appears to be little correlation between better measures of corporate 
governance and bank performance during the crisis. More likely, agents in the financial 
markets were responding to the incentives they faced (see sub-section 4.3). The knowledge 
that large banks which posed systemic risk were likely to be partially bailed out as they were 
“too big to fail” meant that the costs of taking on excessive risk were lower than they should 
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have been. There were also strong incentives to disguise the true underlying risk by making 
the exotic financial instruments more complex and opaque to game regulators and credit 
rating agencies (which also faced their own deep moral hazard issues). Since the rewards on 
the upside were tremendous, but the costs on the downside were muted all players from the 
trader working for a huge annual bonus, to the CEO to the Board of Directors had incentives 
to take on too much camouflaged risk. 
Systemic risk can be mitigated in a number of ways through higher capital requirements 
(Basel 3), living wills, greater transparency and more vigilant regulation. But some type of 
separation of the “utility” part of banking (for example in retail, which has taxpayer insurance) 
from the “casino” part of banking (investment, which does not) is necessary. The Vickers 
Report (Vickers, 2011) moves in this direction, but there remains a question of whether it 
goes far enough to structurally separate the utility from the casino parts of banking since both 
activities will remain within the universal banks and whether it will lead to a more diversified 
sector. 
These are necessary long-run reforms, but there is an immediate problem concerning Small 
and Medium sized Enterprises’ (SME) access to finance. Indeed, some of the reforms such as 
higher capital requirements will make this problem worse as banks are re-building their 
balance sheets by severely restricting lending to build up such capital buffers. More generally 
there remains an issue as to whether we have the right portfolio of support to encourage 
finance for start-ups and post-entry growth. A fundamental point is whether the UK could 
benefit from a bank to help finance these areas - like the KfW in Germany
39
. The Green 
Investment Bank could play this role to a degree but there are perhaps other sectors that could 
do with such a body.  
Higher education 
The UK has an extremely strong higher education sector. The world rankings are dominated 
by the US, but the UK is unique in having so many universities appearing alongside these 
much better financed American schools – for example, in the top 10 of the 2011 Shanghai 
rankings, Cambridge and Oxford are the only two non-US universities
40
.  
There are several economic functions of higher education. First, there is the supply of high 
quality human capital. UK universities have allowed the proportion of people with a college 
degree to rise massively since 1997. Second, there are innovations flowing from science to 
industry. The UK is second only to the US in elite science (and ahead of it in scientific 
productivity as measured by citations and prizes per dollar spent). With less than 1% of the 
world’s population the UK produces over 14% of the most highly cited scientific publications. 
The concern for the UK is whether or not this academic prowess can be translated into 
commercial innovations, in the same way MIT or Stanford are able to do. In some areas this 
has been highly successful, such as bio-pharmaceuticals, but generally this has not been the 
case.  
Third, and less emphasised is that higher education is a major export industry. In the market 
for overseas students, the UK has the second highest world market share and has been 
gaining on the US since 9/11 when America sharply restricted its visa policies. There are 
about 3.3 million overseas students and the market for these overseas students is growing at 
about 7% a year. These students could be worth £5bn to the UK in tuition fees alone if we 
can maintain our market share (McKinsey, 2010). 
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One of the reasons for the UK’s success compared to the other countries has been the high 
degree of autonomy research-based universities have enjoyed. This trend is continuing as the 
state withdraws even more subsidy from the system, and universities respond by raising fees. 
There is certainly a concern with the transition, but also with financial viability, especially in 
the short-term.  
The main current danger to the university system is from an unexpected quarter: immigration 
policy. The commitment to cut net migration to fewer than 100,000has proved almost 
impossible due to the fall of emigration and free movement of people around the EU. 
Consequently the government has tightened the rules for visas for exceptionally highly 
qualified people and students. This is dramatically self-defeating. It has made it much harder 
for universities to recruit their customers in overseas students and acquire top notch faculty. 
Whereas there have been exceptions made for highly paid business people, the government 
does not seem to realise the damage it is doing to one of its key industries. It is hard to 
imagine a worse anti-growth strategy. 
Immigration 
We now turn more directly to the role of immigration. As mentioned the current government 
has a policy of reducing net immigration to the “tens of thousands” whereas the Labour 
government – intentionally or not - presided over a period of large inflows of immigration 
regularly exceeding 200,000 per annum. In 2009 14% of the UK’s working population was 
born abroad, almost a doubling from the level in 1995 (8%). This was in part explicitly 
policy-driven and partly a reflection of the strong relative jobs market that attracted many 
migrants (e.g. from Eastern Europe). 
There is an extensive literature on whether immigration had a negative effect on wages and 
unemployment of natives. Broadly, the answer appears to be that this wave of immigration, 
like those studied in other countries, had little harmful effect on the job market prospects of 
natives (except a small effect on the labour market prospects of the most unskilled workers)
41
. 
The UK’s labour market appeared able to absorb migrants in large part without disruption.  
A tougher question to answer, however, is whether this wave of immigration was beneficial 
to growth. Mechanically, immigration will swell the size of the population and therefore add 
to absolute GDP. But this is largely irrelevant from a welfare point of view – what matters is 
whether immigration improved the material wellbeing of natives, the people already in the 
country, or more precisely for our purposes, does it raise productivity levels and growth. 
Many economists feel instinctively that it should. There is much evidence that openness to 
the movement of goods
42
 has positive dynamic effects on productivity and innovation 
through the spread of ideas and competitive pressure, so why not the free movement of 
people? This idea seems particularly appealing for immigration of the highly skilled, which 
are more likely to stimulate innovation, support a comparative advantage for the UK in 
higher productivity goods and services and (if anything) put downward pressure on inequality 
by increasing the supply of human capital. Indeed, the points-based migration system 
introduced by the last government (and modelled on success stories like Canada) was 
intended to be strongly biased to the most skilled. 
                                                 
41
 See DUSTMANN, C., FRATTINI, T. & PRESTON, I. 2008. The Effect of Immigration along the 
Distribution of Wages. CReAM Discussion Paper No. 03/08 and MANACORDA, M., MANNING, A. & 
WADSWORTH, J. 2006. The Impact of Immigration on the Structure of Male Wages: Theory and Evidence 
from Britain. IZA Discussion Papers 2352. 
42
 For example, the impact of opening up trade with China appears to have had large dynamic benefits on the 
UK and other countries (BLOOM, N., DRACA, M. & VAN REENEN, J. 2011a. Trade Induced Technical 
Change? The Impact of Chinese Imports on Innovation, IT and Productivity. NBER Working Paper, 16717.). 
64 
 
Alas, the evidence for such positive dynamic effects of high skilled immigration is very 
limited. Some US studies have found that very high skilled migrants (like PhD scientists and 
inventors)
43
 do create such innovation benefits and this supports the argument that scientists 
and entrepreneurs should be allowed to move into the UK as freely as soccer players. But we 
simply do not know whether such effects exist for say those with college degrees. Moreover, 
although immigrants are on average better educated and younger than the UK born, the 
pattern is rather “bimodal” with a hump of extremely highly educated and another hump of 
very poorly skilled. Finally, although British rates of immigration rose a lot under Labour 
(although they fell after 2006), immigration is rather higher in many other countries like the 
US and Germany
44
.  
In summary, it is unclear whether immigration in general has a very strong positive or 
negative effect on productivity (at least that is the current state of the evidence). Allowing a 
maximally free movement of very skilled workers, including scientists, however, is a no 
brainer.   
Education and skills 
The UK does relatively well at educating the elite. But it performs spectacularly badly at 
educating and training the bottom third. There have been major improvements in levels, and 
recent research suggests at least some closing of the class gap between 2006 and 2010 (Cook, 
2011). However, the OECD’s internationally comparable Pisa studies of 15 year olds show a 
mediocre position that has not improved. While there have been improvements, adult literacy 
and numeracy rates remain among the worst in the OECD. The problem is finding policies 
that (i) keep the young in schooling for longer and (ii) give effective training to the groups 
who are not likely to go to college.  
On the former, the raising of the education leaving age should help. For the latter, Labour’s 
policies like Individual Learning Accounts and the Leitch agenda to push out level 2 
qualifications, delivered much less than had been hoped. Apprenticeships are a key policy 
tool in this area, but it was only towards the end of Labour’s period that these were taken 
seriously enough. The Coalition has expanded the numbers of apprenticeships, but these have 
been mainly for adults rather than under 19 year olds (and there are some worries on quality 
and the degree to which they are going to existing employees
45
). The latter group is where 
there is a particular problem. The current system is too based on certification rather than 
learning and employers are insufficiently engaged (Steedman, 2010).   
Infrastructure  
One reason for the UK’s historical productivity gap has been a low level of public investment. 
At the current juncture of very low global interest rates, investment in infrastructure seems a 
very attractive proposition and is unlikely to scare the markets in the same way that 
government consumption would. 
Rather than relying on “Grand Projet” such as the planned high speed rail links, the 
government should consider the myriad smaller schemes of road and rail investments that 
could have larger and less risky returns. The high speed links are also likely to benefit 
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London more than their connected regions, so believing that they are a form of regional 
rebalancing (even if this was desirable) is an illusion. 
Competition  
It is clear to us that competition has been key in driving productivity and when it has not been 
present historically the UK has suffered. We agree with those who believe that the authorities 
must be vigilant with market investigations and are concerned that present desire to merge the 
OFT and Competition Commission will only distract from the pressure for competitive 
markets.  
The Single Market has been a major force in driving greater competition in goods across the 
EU and has brought tremendous benefits. The stalling of greater market integration (e.g. 
through the watering down of the Services Directive) and more globally the Doha round is 
holding back productivity. More dangerously, there are increasing calls for trade protection 
which would almost guarantee a prolonging of the recession, just as happened in the Inter-
war period.  
Regulation and planning 
Regulation in general 
Regulation is the area most frequently cited by business people as a barrier to productivity. 
This is a rather vague, catch-all phrase, and such evidence has to be treated with care. In 
addition, since much of the UK’s regulatory system stems from Europe, UK policy makers 
are limited in their ability to affect this. Regulation of industry has been relatively light-touch 
and in the privatised utilities, this has been generally successful. The issue often debated is 
whether there has been too little of this sort of regulation: we discussed financial regulation 
already and there are concerns over the energy market. 
Labour market regulation 
Labour regulation increased since 1997: there were more rights for trade unions (employers 
have to grant recognition if a majority of workers vote for it), more opportunities for flexible 
work and maternity/paternity leave, the first national minimum wage and a shorter time 
period before employees qualified for unfair dismissal. Productivity growth did not seem to 
falter in the face of these, and the (small) empirical literature examining these do not seem to 
have uncovered large negative productivity effects (Draca et al., 2011). Of course one could 
argue it would have been even higher if the UK had not slid down the OECD’s rankings of 
labour market flexibility. The main point, however, is that the UK retains perhaps the most 
flexible labour markets in the EU and Labour did not return to the heavily regulated labour 
market of the 1970s with militant trade unions. Indeed, only 24% of employed people were 
union members in 2010 compared to 29% in 1995
46
. In the private sector, the figure has 
fallen to 14% (from 21% in 1995), implying that unions are becoming less and less relevant.  
Land regulation 
Planning is an area where the UK has had historically tough restrictions. On the residential 
side it is clear that we are not building enough houses to meet our needs (Barker, 2006, 
Nickell, 2011). On the commercial side, many reports have emphasised how restrictive 
planning holds back productivity in the retail sector. Chesire and Hilber (2011), for example, 
estimate that supermarket productivity is reduced by at least 20% in England by land 
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restrictions
47
. This keeps UK retail productivity much lower than countries like France or the 
US (McKinsey, (2010), Haskel and Sadun, (2011)). Although the restrictions on major scale 
out-of- town supermarkets is a trade-off that policy makers (and some of the public) seem to 
feel is worthwhile, it is an open question whether they realise the true scale of the damage. 
In terms of allowing high tech clusters to grow around Oxford and Cambridge, building 
constraints seem to be a key factor. This is an example of where a more focused growth 
policy could help. It is likely that software is going to continue to be a globally high growth 
sector and the UK has some advantages in this area because of strong academic computer 
science skills. However, there needs to be a relaxation of physical space constraints for 
growth to occur. It is not unreasonable for people to support land planning restrictions if they 
place a high disutility on some green spaces being “concreted over”. But the costs of such 
policies in terms of lost output must be made more explicit – too many of the costs of 
regulation are hidden.  
Current policy here is rather ambiguous. On the one hand there has been more devolution of 
planning which would seem to encourage Nimbyism. On the other hand the new planning 
guidance seeks to make an assumption in favour of growth when considering applications. 
On the face of it, this could stimulate more action, although it seems rather untargeted.   
Tax 
The structure of UK taxation has been the study of an extensive recent report, the Mirrlees 
Review (IFS, 2009). We agree with most of what was stressed under this review, such as 
removing the corporate tax bias towards debt and away from equity. The critical thing is not 
the level of the rates of marginal taxation which has been the obsession of debate in the 
media and political circles. Around the marginal rates that exist in the UK and most OECD 
countries, the loss of output from disincentive effects is relatively minor. 
The real problem with the tax system is its complexity and instability. Changes are made 
piecemeal without much regard to how different parts of the tax system interrelate and how 
the tax system interacts closely with the benefit system (e.g. housing benefits). Furthermore, 
much could be gained from removing the bias towards financing investment though debt 
instead of equity. Finally, the encouragement of family firms through the inheritance tax 
system is a distortion which reduces productivity and should be scrapped. 
5.6 Summary on Policies for Long-Run Growth 
The purpose of the report is analytical rather than prescriptive. A blueprint for growth is the 
subject of a future report from a larger commission. Nevertheless, this section has tried to 
sketch some principles, practices and particulars. 
The most important lesson is to try and get the policy environment right in terms of the 
physical and human capital infrastructure (including e-infrastructure e.g. internet/telecoms), 
competition, regulation (especially over finance) and tax. Stability, transparency and 
simplicity are important rather than obsessive tinkering. This will ensure that when 
opportunities do arrive, the private sector is in good shape to take advantage of these new 
(and often unforeseen) chances. 
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Beyond this, however, there is a case for a more pro-active growth strategy. The starting 
point of this is to examine areas where global growth is likely to come from and where the 
UK has some comparative advantage. The intersection of these is where attention should be 
focused on removing barriers and fostering development (in the form of local public goods). 
One example of such a Plan for Growth would include higher education where current 
immigration policy is explicitly undermining one of the sectors with great potential. The 
same immigration policy will also hamper business services which have been an engine of 
productivity growth since the mid-1990s. A second example would be software, where 
planning restrictions are holding back development of high tech clusters. A third would be 
bio-medical research where red tape is accelerating the loss of clinical trials in the UK’s 
leading high tech manufacturing sector. 
Such a modern “industrial policy” is not about picking winners, but rather a way of thinking 
about growth that is much better than the current confusion. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Details of Decompositions of UK Macro-Economic 
Performance 
Figure 1-3 graphically displayed UK performance and this appendix contains the key 
numbers underlying these graphs. Table A.1 summarises the two decompositions of GDP per 
capita for the UK and comparator countries: US, Germany and France in the pre and post-
1997 periods
48
.  The UK had a GDP per capita growth rate of 1.36 percentage points per year 
after 1997 (see Table 1). This is broken down into a 1.31% contribution from GDP per 
worker and 0.05% contribution from labour per capita (Panel A). In hours terms the 1.36% is 
broken down into GDP per hour growth of 1.69% and hours per capita growth of -0.32% in 
Panel B. This indicates that although the employment rate was broadly stable, hours worked 
per worker have declined.  Looking down column (2) we can see that on both the per worker 
and per hour basis, productivity growth was faster in the US than the UK, but labour market 
performance (column (3)) was stronger in the UK than the US (which underperformed 
relative to Europe over this period). 
Columns (4)-(6) compare these to the 1979-1997 (“Conservative”) period and the last three 
columns gives the differences. In Panel A we see that per capita GDP growth was stronger 
under the Conservatives by 0.66% (column (7)) and this was driven by faster productivity 
growth (over a percentage point higher: 1.97% compared to 1.31%). The growth in the 
employment rate was the same (0.05%). For GDP per hour in Panel B we see that both 
productivity and hours per worker were lower under Labour, by 0.36% and 0.30% 
respectively. 
It is noticeable that all the countries did worse in the post 1997 period however, as column (7) 
shows negative numbers for the US and France too. This suggests that there were global 
macro-economic shocks which made things harder everywhere (especially the Great 
Recession).   
Table A.2 tries to account for these worldwide trends in a “difference in difference” 
framework by looking at the UK’s relative performance before and after Labour took power. 
If we consider the US as the “control” country then we see that the per capita GDP grew 
faster in the UK in the Labour period by 0.42% p.a. But it also grew faster than the US in the 
Conservative period by 0.13% per annum. The improvement under Labour in this “difference 
in difference” estimate was 0.29% (=0.42%-0.13%). So this suggests that compared to the US 
which is the usual benchmark, the UK accelerated the “catch up” process post 1997. However, 
Table A.2 also shows that if France was the control group for the UK, then the improvement 
slowed down under Labour. Under the Conservatives the UK grew 0.74% faster than France, 
but under Labour it only grew 0.46% than France: a difference in difference of 0.28%. The 
pattern is even more complex when we look at the decompositions. The difference in 
difference shows that the UK’s improvement over the US was a labour market phenomenon 
with the growth of the British employment rate much better than America’s (productivity 
catch up was actually better under the Conservative’s). The opposite is true for France. 
Although in terms of overall GDP per capita catch-up with France Labour fared worse the 
Conservatives, Labour’s productivity catch-up was faster than it was pre-1979.   
There is no right or wrong answer here as other countries have also been instituting policy 
reforms so there is no clean “placebo” group. The UK certainly improved relative to its main 
                                                 
48
 Growth rates for the Unified Germany are shown for the post-1997 period only as it was not possible to obtain 
a full and consistent time series of working age adults for the East and West Germany pre-1997. 
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peers since 1997 and in GDP per capita terms this seems to have sped up against the US and 
slowed down against France.  
The Great Recession has had a major effect on the world economy and the UK in particular. 
We repeat Table A.1 and Table A.2  but stop the series in 2007 to show the importance of the 
crisis. The UK’s absolute and relative performance looks generally stronger when we exclude 
the recession. In particular, in Table A4 the UK has had a relative improvement against 
France as well as the US when we end the series in 2007. 
In this appendix we also include a longer term view of the UK’s relative performance against 
its peers, to show that 1979 marked the end of its relative decline. Table A.5 shows real GDP 
per head for US, Germany and France relative to the UK (i.e. UK=100 in each year), taken 
from Crafts (2010). This shows that from 1979 the UK’s decline relative to these three 
comparator countries began to reverse. 
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Table A.1: Growth rate in real GDP per capita (defined here as adult) and its components, including the Great Recession 
Notes: Analysis based on OECD data and US BLS for “working age adults”.  Coefficients (and standard errors) obtained from linear regression models to fit annual data from 
1979 to 2010. Consistent series for a unified Germany are available from 1991 onwards. 1997 GDP is US$, constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base year (2005). We note 
that the growth rates shown in column 1 do not correspond exactly to the GDP per adult in Table 1. This is because the growth rates reported here are calculated using a linear 
regression of the log of the series on a time trend and a constant. Table 1 reports cumulative annual growth rates which use the start and end year only. 
GDP per 
capita
GDP per 
labour input
Labour input 
per capita
GDP per 
capita
GDP per 
labour input
Labour input 
per capita
GDP per 
capita
GDP per 
labour input
Labour input 
per capita
GDP per 
capita
GDP per 
labour input
Labour input 
per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)=(1)-(4) (8)=(2)-(5) (9)=(3)-(6)
Panel A: Labour input measured as number of workers
UK 1.36 1.31 0.05 2.03 1.97 0.05 -0.66 -0.66 0.00 34,429        58,967        0.58           
s.d 0.24 0.16 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.27 0.17 0.14
US 0.95 1.84 -0.89 1.90 1.39 0.51 -0.96 0.45 -1.40 48,162        69,930        0.69           
s.d 0.18 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.20 0.11 0.15
Germany 0.93 0.73 0.20 33,855        62,172        0.54           
s.d 0.13 0.12 0.09
France 0.90 0.82 0.09 1.29 1.74 -0.45 -0.39 -0.92 0.54 34,378        65,273        0.53           
s.d 0.15 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.16 0.09 0.11
Panel B: Labour input measured as number of hours
UK 1.36 1.69 -0.32 2.03 2.05 -0.02 -0.66 -0.36 -0.30 34,429        34              1,011          
s.d 0.24 0.16 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.17 0.27 0.18 0.19
US 0.95 2.09 -1.14 1.90 1.40 0.51 -0.96 0.69 -1.65 48,162        40              1,198          
s.d 0.18 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.20 0.11 0.17
Germany 0.93 1.26 -0.32 33,855        41              822            
s.d 0.13 0.11 0.10
France 0.90 1.24 -0.34 1.29 2.71 -1.42 -0.39 -1.47 1.09 34,378        41              835            
s.d 0.15 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.16 0.20 0.13
1997-2010 1979-1997 Change 1997 levels
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Table A.2: Relative growth rates of GDP per capita (defined here as adult) pre post-1997, including the Great Recession 
 
Notes: Analysis based on OECD data and US BLS for “working age adults”.  Entries in column 1 represent the difference in the estimated trend growth rate in GDP per 
capita between the UK and the comparison country (from Table A.1), columns 2 and 3 represent the equivalent under decomposition 1, and columns 4 and 5 for 
decomposition 2. Germany is excluded from this analysis because consistent series for the unified Germany are available from 1991 onwards. 
Difference in 
growth rate of 
GDP per capita GDP per worker
Employment per 
capita GDP per hour Hours per capita
1 2 3 4 5
UK - US 0.13 0.58 -0.45 0.65 -0.53
UK - France 0.74 0.24 0.50 -0.66 1.40
UK - US 0.42 -0.53 0.95 -0.40 0.82
UK - France 0.46 0.50 -0.03 0.45 0.01
UK - US 0.29 -1.11 1.40 -1.05 1.34
UK - France -0.28 0.26 -0.54 1.11 -1.39
B. 1997-2010
C. Difference in growth rates: 1979-1997 compared to 1997-2010
Decomposition 1 Decomposition 2
A. 1979-1997
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Table A.3: Growth rate in real GDP per capita (defined here as adult) and its components, excluding the Great Recession 
Notes: Analysis based on OECD data and US BLS for “working age adults”.  Coefficients (and standard errors) obtained from linear regression models to fit annual data from 
1979 to 2007. Consistent series for a unified Germany are available from 1991 onwards. 1997 GDP is US$, constant prices, constant PPPs, OECD base year (2005). We note 
that the growth rates shown in column 1 do not correspond exactly to the GDP per adult in Table 1. This is because the growth rates reported here are calculated using a linear 
regression of the log of the series on a time trend and a constant. Table 1 reports cumulative annual growth rates which use the start and end year only. 
GDP per 
capita
GDP per 
labour input
Labour 
input per 
capita
GDP per 
capita
GDP per 
labour input
Labour 
input per 
capita
GDP per 
capita
GDP per 
labour input
Labour 
input per 
capita
GDP per 
capita
GDP per 
labour input
Labour 
input per 
capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)=(1)-(4) (8)=(2)-(5) (9)=(3)-(6)
Panel A: Labour input measured as number of workers
UK 2.10 1.81 0.29 2.03 1.97 0.05 0.07 -0.16 0.24 34,429      58,967      0.58         
s.d 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.12
US 1.48 2.10 -0.62 1.90 1.39 0.51 -0.42 0.71 -1.13 48,162      69,930      0.69         
s.d 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.15 0.10 0.14
Germany 1.03 0.99 0.04 33,855      62,172      0.54         
s.d 0.15 0.08 0.12
France 1.31 1.04 0.26 1.29 1.74 -0.45 0.02 -0.70 0.71 34,378      65,273      0.53         
s.d 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.14 0.08 0.14
Panel B: Labour input measured as number of hours
UK 2.10 2.21 -0.11 2.03 2.05 -0.02 0.07 0.16 -0.09 34,429      34            1,011       
s.d 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.08 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.18
US 1.48 2.34 -0.86 1.90 1.40 0.51 -0.42 0.95 -1.37 48,162      40            1,198       
s.d 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.18
Germany 1.03 1.58 -0.55 33,855      41            822          
s.d 0.15 0.07 0.11
France 1.31 1.73 -0.42 1.29 2.71 -1.42 0.02 -0.98 1.00 34,378      41            835          
s.d 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.16 0.15
1997-2007 1979-1997 Change 1997 levels
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Table A.4: Relative growth rates of GDP Per Capita (defined here as adult) pre post-1997, excluding the Great Recession 
 
Notes: Analysis based on OECD data and US BLS for “working age adults”.  Entries in column 1 represent the difference in the estimated trend growth rate in GDP per 
capita between the UK and the comparison country (from Table A.3), columns 2 and 3 represent the equivalent under decomposition 1, and columns 4 and 5 for 
decomposition 2. Germany is excluded from this analysis because consistent series for the unified Germany are available from 1991 onwards. 
 
 
Difference in 
growth rate of 
GDP per capita GDP per worker
Employment per 
capita GDP per hour Hours per capita
1 2 3 4 5
UK - US 0.13 0.58 -0.45 0.65 -0.53
UK - France 0.74 0.24 0.50 -0.66 1.40
UK - US 0.62 -0.29 0.91 -0.13 0.75
UK - France 0.80 0.77 0.03 0.49 0.31
UK - US 0.49 -0.87 1.37 -0.78 1.28
UK - France 0.06 0.53 -0.48 1.15 -1.09
Decomposition 1 Decomposition 2
A. 1979-1997
B. 1997-2007
C. Difference in growth rates: 1979-1997 compared to 1997-2007
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Table A.5: Real GDP per capita (UK=100 in each year) 
Notes: Reproduced from Crafts (2010). Analysis based on data sourced from Angus Maddison historical 
database and West Germany in 2007 calculated from Statistiches Bundesamt Deutschland 2010.  Note that 
estimates refer to Germany from 1870 to 1937. 
 
 
  USA West Germany France 
1870 76.6 57.6 58.8 
1913 107.8 74.1 70.8 
1929 125.3 73.6 85.6 
1937 103.4 75.4 72.2 
1950 137.7 61.7 74.7 
1979 142.7 115.9 111.1 
2007 132.6 98.6 94.3 
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Appendix 2: Detailed Sector Growth Accounting 
Table A.6: Growth accounting by sector, UK, annual average growth rates in percentage points  
 
Growth rate of 
VA Hours worked
Labour 
productivity
Labour 
composition
ICT capital per 
hour
Non ICT capital 
per hour TFP
1 = 2 + 3 2 3 = 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 4 5 6 7 4 + 5 + 7
1979-1997
Total Industries 2.1 -0.1 2.2 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.7 1.5
Market economy 2.3 -0.4 2.7 0.3 0.6 0.7 1.1 2.0
Electrical machinery, post and communication 4.7 -1.0 5.7 0.3 1.7 0.5 3.2 5.2
Manufacturing excluding electrical 0.3 -2.0 2.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 1.6 2.2
Other goods producing industries 1.8 -1.3 3.1 0.3 0.2 1.1 1.5 2.0
Distribution services 2.5 0.0 2.4 0.1 0.6 0.4 1.3 2.0
Financial intermediation 3.3 1.0 2.3 0.3 1.2 1.3 -0.5 1.0
Business services and renting of m&eq 5.5 2.9 2.6 0.8 1.3 1.1 -0.6 1.5
Personal and social services 2.7 1.3 1.5 0.6 0.4 1.0 -0.6 0.4
Non market economy 1.3 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.6 -0.6 0.2
Public admin, education and health 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.2 -0.5 0.4
Real estate activities 2.5 1.1 1.4 0.3 0.1 2.2 -1.2 -0.8
1997-2007
Total Industries 2.7 0.6 2.0 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.4 1.5
Market economy 3.2 0.4 2.8 0.5 0.8 0.5 1.0 2.3
Electrical machinery, post and communication 6.0 -1.2 7.2 0.5 2.1 0.0 4.6 7.2
Manufacturing excluding electrical 0.3 -2.2 2.6 0.6 0.4 -0.1 1.7 2.7
Other goods producing industries 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.5 -0.4 -0.1
Distribution services 3.4 0.5 3.0 0.4 0.7 0.8 1.1 2.2
Financial intermediation 5.1 0.8 4.3 0.9 1.5 0.0 1.9 4.3
Business services and renting of m&eq 6.9 2.6 4.3 0.5 1.5 1.0 1.3 3.3
Personal and social services 2.0 1.8 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.8 -1.4 -0.6
Non market economy 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.9 -1.5 -0.9
Public admin, education and health 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.1 -0.9 -0.1
Real estate activities 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.6 -2.8 -2.5
VA contribution from Labour productivity contributions from
Labour productivity 
contribution from 
knowledge 
economy
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Table A.7: Growth accounting by sector, US, annual average growth rates in percentage points 
 
Notes: Analysis based on EU KLEMS data. 
Growth rate of 
VA Hours worked
Labour 
productivity
Labour 
composition
ICT capital per 
hour
Non ICT capital 
per hour TFP
1 = 2 + 3 2 3 = 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 4 5 6 7 4 + 5 + 7
1979-1997
Total Industries 2.7 1.0 1.7 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.0 0.8
Market economy 3.2 0.9 2.2 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.4 1.5
Electrical machinery, post and communication 6.6 0.6 6.0 0.3 1.2 0.8 3.8 5.3
Manufacturing excluding electrical 1.3 -0.3 1.6 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 1.2
Other goods producing industries 1.8 0.5 1.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.8
Distribution services 3.9 0.9 3.0 0.2 0.6 0.6 1.6 2.4
Financial intermediation 3.2 1.2 2.0 0.2 2.4 2.2 -2.9 -0.2
Business services and renting of m&eq 5.3 3.9 1.4 0.1 1.7 0.7 -1.1 0.7
Personal and social services 2.8 1.7 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5
Non market economy 1.8 1.0 0.8 0.2 0.2 1.4 -1.0 -0.6
Public admin, education and health 1.4 1.5 -0.1 0.3 0.3 0.6 -1.4 -0.8
Real estate activities 2.6 0.1 2.5 0.0 0.0 2.7 -0.2 -0.2
1997-2007
Total Industries 3.0 0.7 2.3 0.2 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.6
Market economy 3.4 0.5 2.9 0.3 0.9 0.5 1.2 2.5
Electrical machinery, post and communication 8.2 -1.2 9.4 0.3 1.4 0.5 7.2 8.9
Manufacturing excluding electrical 1.1 -1.3 2.4 0.2 0.5 0.1 1.5 2.3
Other goods producing industries 0.3 1.1 -0.8 0.0 0.4 0.7 -1.9 -1.5
Distribution services 4.2 0.4 3.8 0.3 0.7 0.4 2.4 3.4
Financial intermediation 4.5 0.8 3.8 0.4 1.7 0.8 0.9 3.0
Business services and renting of m&eq 4.8 2.2 2.6 0.4 1.8 0.7 -0.4 1.8
Personal and social services 3.2 1.2 1.9 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.5
Non market economy 2.1 0.9 1.1 0.2 0.3 1.3 -0.6 -0.2
Public admin, education and health 1.7 1.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 -0.9 -0.2
Real estate activities 2.7 0.1 2.6 0.0 0.1 2.6 -0.2 -0.1
VA contribution from Labour productivity contributions from Labour 
productivity 
contribution from 
knowledge 
economy
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Appendix 3: Sector Contributions to Market Economy Labour Productivity Growth 
Table A.8: Calculations underlying the sector contributions to market economy labour productivity growth (share in nominal GVA 
weightings) 
 
Notes: Analysis based on EU KLEMS data. The “labour productivity contribution” of a sector is the annual average growth of real gross value added in the sector. The 
“average share of ME GVA” is the share of the sector in nominal gross value added averaged over the relevant time period. The “weighted contribution” to aggregate market 
economy productivity (the annual average growth in real gross value added per hour) is the product of “labour productivity contribution” multiplied by “average share of ME 
GVA”.  
 
UK EU US France
 Labour 
productivity 
contribution 
 Average share 
of ME GVA 
 Weighted 
contribitions 
 Labour 
productivity 
contribution 
 Average share 
of ME GVA 
 Weighted 
contribitions 
 Labour 
productivity 
contribution 
 Average share 
of ME GVA 
 Weighted 
contribitions 
 Labour 
productivity 
contribution 
 Average share 
of ME GVA 
 Weighted 
contribitions 
1979-1996
Electrical machinery, post and communication 5.69 7% 0.41 4.56 7% 0.33 6.04 9% 0.54 4.12 6% 0.27
Manufacturing excluding electrical 2.31 26% 0.61 2.54 27% 0.69 1.59 24% 0.38 2.60 23% 0.60
Other goods producing industries 3.08 20% 0.62 2.41 18% 0.45 1.30 15% 0.20 2.92 19% 0.54
Distribution services 2.45 21% 0.51 2.44 21% 0.51 2.97 23% 0.68 3.19 21% 0.68
Financial intermediation 2.32 8% 0.18 1.95 8% 0.15 1.99 9% 0.19 1.38 7% 0.10
Business services and renting of m&eq 2.61 10% 0.25 1.39 11% 0.15 1.41 12% 0.16 0.33 15% 0.05
Personal and social services 1.47 8% 0.12 0.06 8% 0.00 1.02 8% 0.08 -0.11 8% -0.01
Reallocation -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.01
Market economy 2.67 100% 2.67 2.28 100% 2.28 2.22 100% 2.22 2.24 100% 2.24
1997-2007
Electrical machinery, post and communication 7.24 6% 0.47 6.27 7% 0.44 9.41 8% 0.74 7.25 6% 0.42
Manufacturing excluding electrical 2.57 19% 0.48 2.03 24% 0.48 2.36 19% 0.45 2.67 20% 0.52
Other goods producing industries 0.43 15% 0.06 0.83 15% 0.13 -0.81 14% -0.11 1.23 15% 0.19
Distribution services 2.96 22% 0.67 2.12 21% 0.45 3.76 22% 0.82 2.28 23% 0.51
Financial intermediation 4.32 9% 0.37 3.16 8% 0.25 3.75 12% 0.47 2.90 7% 0.21
Business services and renting of m&eq 4.26 18% 0.77 1.40 16% 0.22 2.56 16% 0.41 0.77 20% 0.16
Personal and social services 0.23 11% 0.02 0.18 9% 0.02 1.94 9% 0.18 1.51 9% 0.14
Reallocation -0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.03
Market economy 2.79 100% 2.79 1.98 100% 1.98 2.94 100% 2.94 2.18 100% 2.18
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Appendix 4: Output Gap Methodologies of the Relevant International 
Institutions 
Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) 
Summary from OBR (2011a). Most recent published estimates from OBR (2011b). 
OBR estimates the “output gap” for purposes of economic and fiscal forecasting, and 
carrying out assessments on whether the government is on course to achieve its medium term 
fiscal targets. The last estimate (published March 2011) used data from 2007Q1 to 2010Q3. 
Two approaches are used to combine the cyclical indicators, which are standardised prior to 
estimation so that they are all expressed in comparable units of measurement: 
 Aggregate composites method: Weighted average of survey indicators of capacity 
utilisation and recruitment difficulties. The weights on each indicator are based on 
factor income shares and sector shares. 
The following raw (unstandardized) series is constructed: 
       (   )   
Where: 
  = labour share of income (total employee compensation / gross value added) 
 = aggregated average measure of recruitment difficulties (average of BoE Agent 
Scores recruitment difficulties indicator and combination of BCC and CBI indicators) 
 =aggregated average measure of capacity utilisation – the weighted average of 
capacity utilisation in manufacturing (from BCC, BCI and BoE) and services (BCC 
and BoE) 
 Principal components method: Identification of the common determinant of a set of 
cyclical indicators, with weights (“loadings”) being assigned according to the 
underlying properties of the dataset. The PCA is carried out using STATA or E-Views 
using all variables in standardised form. 
The combination of variables based on these weights can then be used to construct the 
raw series: 
   ∑
    
     
Where: 
  = standardised cyclical indicator i 
  = the factor loading corresponding to indicator i 
The indicator variables include the unemployment gap (ONS, OECD), earnings 
growth (ONS), a number of recruitment difficulties indicators (BCC, CBI), the 
percentage of financial services firms with levels of business above normal 
(CBI/PwC), capacity utilisation statistics (CBI), wages or compensation/GVA (OBR, 
ONS), and change in unit wage costs (OBR, ONS).  All variables are standardised 
using data from 1995Q1-2010Q3. 
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The raw series   and   are then transformed to an appropriate output gap scale. Each series is 
standardised using its mean and standard deviation since 1995Q1, and then scaled to the 
mean and standard deviation of the OECD’s historical output gap series49. 
A further step is applied to the PCA series X. This estimate tends to be relatively volatile (due 
to the fact the PCA finds combinations of variables with the greatest variance). Therefore, a 3 
quarter moving average is applied to the series to adjust for the volatility. 
OECD  
Summary from Beffy et al (2006), and revisions in OECD (2009). Most recent published 
estimates from OECD (2011).  
The OECD publishes output gap estimates in the context of its annual June and December 
Economic Outlook. Its output gap measure is expressed as the difference between actual and 
estimated potential GDP, in volume terms and in per cent of potential GDP.  
A production function approach is used, with the exact specification varying across countries 
depending on data availability. For most countries potential output is estimated using data on 
capital services, total factor productivity and potential employment which in part depends on 
estimates of the structural rate of unemployment (NAIRU). It should be stressed that the 
estimated levels of potential output are subject to significant margins of error.  
The underlying approach is a two factor (capital and labour) Constant Returns to Scale Cobb-
Douglas production function which is subject to labour augmenting technical progress. Over 
time, this framework has been enriched in a number of ways, for example to correct labour 
inputs for hours worked and to incorporate measures of the underlying structural rates of 
unemployment (NAIRU) based on a model of inflationary pressures. Originally the estimates 
were for the the business sector but more recently (due mainly to data issues; in particular the 
use of chain linking makes it harder to estimate business sector variables, especially on a 
comparable cross country basis) a total economy approach has been used. 
      (            ) (   )    
Where: 
    = real GDP 
     = TFP, computed as a residual 
  = total employment 
   = hours worked per employee 
   = whole economy capital stock 
 = labour’s share of income 
Defining the working age population as     , the participation rate as      and 
unemployment rate as    ,     can be rewritten as           (     ). So that we 
now have: 
      (                (     )     ) (   )    
The computation of potential output is based on the following steps and assumptions: 
 
                                                 
49
 Definition of OECD output gap: percentage difference between actual GDP in constant prices, and estimated 
potential GDP. The latter is estimated using a production function approach with the exact specification varying 
across countries depending on data availability.  
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 TFP is obtained from solving out the first expression 
 TFP, hours and the participation rate are then de-trended using an HP filter 
 The NAIRU is based on the Kalman filter estimation approach 
Finally, potential output is given by our expanded expression using filtered variables as 
inputs into the production function. 
Capital stock is obtained from the following identity over a short term horizon: 
        (      )        
Where     represents the whole economy investment and      the scrapping rate. 
Capital services (or productive capital) are used as the capital input into the production 
function. The OECD states that capital services are preferable to traditional measures of 
capital stock for two reasons: firstly, it takes better account of age-efficiency and retirement 
profiles of specific asset groups and incorporates a more satisfactory weighting scheme based 
on the marginal productivity of different assets, both of which are particularly important 
during periods of rapidly changing technologies. Secondly, capital services provide more 
transparency because the measure is derived according to a unified and identifiable method 
specifically designed to be comparable across countries. 
Capital services are typically estimated in index form and need to be benchmarked to a given 
year. Benchmark measures of total economy capital stocks are used to arbitrarily rescale 
capital services measures. 
Until 2009, capital services measures were smoothed (using an HP filter) when estimating the 
potential level. Since 2009, however, it has been considered that the actual series should be 
used. The reasoning for this was that the financial crisis has severely affected investment and 
growth in capital stock in most countries, and it is difficult to assess the longer term 
consequences and hence the implications for smoothed capital services. These changes 
therefore imply greater variability in capital and hence potential growth, and a bigger hit to 
potential output during the crisis. 
The second key change relates to NAIRU. Following the shock to labour markets of the crisis, 
and because of hysteresis type effects in some countries, NAIRUs have been revised upwards. 
IMF  
Summary from World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2010). Most recent published estimates 
World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2011). 
The IMF uses its Global Projection Model (GPM), a non-linear, forward looking, 
multicounty model, which contains a block that computes estimates of potential output and 
the output gap. 
The block is in the class of “unobserved components models” (because model splits 
observable output into two unobservable components: potential output and the output gap). 
GPM’s estimates of potential output are conditioned on three variables, other than output 
itself: 
 Unemployment, operating through Okun’s law (an empirically observed relationship 
relating unemployment to losses in a country's production) 
 Capacity utilisation. If output is depressed because of a negative demand shock, 
production falls more than capacity, opening spare capacity. But if the shock is to 
productivity, the desired capital stock would fall and capital investment would also 
fall, reducing capacity. Therefore, a small amount of spare capacity indicates a 
88 
 
negative supply shock. The model reads data on capacity utilisation and infers from 
prediction errors in this and other series whether utilisation has changed due to a 
demand shock or whether equilibrium capacity has changed. 
 Inflation: if inflation is stable over time there must be neither excess demand nor 
excess supply, but influence of excess demand on inflation is weak, so inflation’s role 
in estimating potential output in the GPM is a weak one. 
NIESR (Barrell and Kirby) 
Summary from Barrell and Kirby (2011) and discussion with Ray Barrell 
The NIESR’s preferred approach is the production function approach. A global model, the 
NiGEM, is used with an estimated and calibrated production function (see 
http://nimodel.niesr.ac.uk/logon/nigem.php?sw=0&t=3&b=2&tw=1 for more detail). 
Includes energy as well as labour and capital inputs. The elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labour is assumed to be half and the elasticity of substitution between other inputs 
and energy (oil, coal, gas) is one. 
Up until 2007 NIESR had been using a Baxter King filter, but it became clear that the 
financial crisis would change trend output, and hence the filter would not be useful as it is 
less able to deal with sharp changes at the end of a sample period. 
Trend output is produced by equilibrium capital, equilibrium labour input and the level of 
technical progress. Therefore it is necessary to understand what determines each of these, and 
also what impact has the financial crisis had on their sustainable levels. These issues were 
addressed in a number of papers, the first of which (Barrell and Kirby, 2008) was written in 
the summer before Lehman’s collapsed. 
Capital 
By 2008, it was already clear that risk premia on investment decisions would be higher in the 
foreseeable future than for the last decade or so. Barrell and Kirby (2008) look at market 
based premia on BAA debts in the UK and elsewhere and judged that they had risen by 
perhaps 300 basis points. Bank borrowing costs had also risen, and it was assumed that they 
would stay higher for a sustained period. The rise in risk premia would raise the user cost of 
capital, with the impact depending on the effect of the crisis on the equity risk premium. It 
was estimated that the user cost would rise by 200 basis points from 12 per cent. Given that 
the evidence suggests that the UK operates with a CES production function with an elasticity 
of around a half (Barrell and Pain, 1997) it was judged the impact on the crisis on sustainable 
output through capital was to reduce it by 2 per cent or a bit more. The Lehman crisis raised 
this estimate somewhat, with a production function based scar of perhaps 3 per cent of GDP 
in total. The effect would feed in slowly as the capital output ratio has to adjust downward. 
Equilibrium output calculations for 2010 used actual capital. 
Labour 
Trend labour input (person hours) has to be based on an hours equation, a wage equation and 
an employment or labour demand equation (and hence a price mark-up). These give an output 
a measure of the NAIRU, but it is the trend input that matters. The trend is calculated using a 
Baxter King filter on total employment hours with the forecast included to avoid endpoint 
problems and also to take account of any assumed structural changes. This also ensures the 
filter does not follow actual input too closely in a downturn. It was judged (Barrell and Kirby, 
2011) that the “scarring” from unemployment would raise the NAIRU by up to 1 per cent. It 
addition, it was initially judged that the recession would reduce migration, but it has not, so 
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by 2010 this was no longer accounted for. The combination of the scar to capital and to 
labour input left a permanent impact of 3 to 4 per cent from the crisis. 
Participation rates can be judged from recent trends and also from changes in retirement 
legislation, which are discussed in Barrell and Kirby (2011).  
TFP 
This rests on research at various times. The work is discussed for instance in Barrell et al. 
(2011) which compares the UK to other countries up until 2007, and looks at the role of the 
financial sector. The view is that technical progress will be slightly slower in the future than 
in the recent past, partly because of a slight shrinking of finance, but also due to a degree of 
catching up with the US and West Germany in recent years. However, it was not expected 
that the crisis in and of itself would reduce the level of technical progress or its growth rate. 
European Commission 
Summary from Cotis et al. (2005) and European Economic Forecast (EC, 2011). Most recent 
estimates published in European Commission Autumn Forecast  
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/forecasts/2010_autumn_forecast_en.htm)  
The European Commission uses a production function approach, very similar to that used by 
the OECD, having previously used statistical filter methods. The principal differences with 
the OECD method are that EC estimates do not incorporate hours and a NAWRU rather than 
a NAIRU (non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment) is estimated (i.e. using information 
on wages rather than prices). 
 
 
